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INTRODUCTION
B ANKRUPTCY priority rules are fixed--or so it seems. Absolutepriority is central to the structure of business reorganization and is,
quite appropriately, bankruptcy's most important and famous rule.' Be-
cause a firm in bankruptcy lacks sufficient value to repay all its credi-
tors, priority rules determine the order of payment. The absolute priority
rule commands that when distributing value in bankruptcy, claimants'
priorities outside of bankruptcy are honored inside bankruptcy.2 The rule
is sufficiently ingrained in bankruptcy thinking that, as its name sug-
gests, priority must be immutable. It is absolute. On this view, the nor-
mal science of Chapter 11 corporate reorganization involves primarily
the resolution and compromise of legal and factual ambiguities relating
to creditors' competing priorities. The absolute priority rule provides the
fixed framework within which the players negotiate the plan of reorgan-
ization and within which the judge evaluates it.3
The immutability of priorities is so central to our understanding of
corporate reorganization that violations of absolute priority are trou-
bling,4 deserving careful study and detailed explication. "Explain-
ing ... deviations [from absolute priority] has been a central preoccupa-
1 See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116 (1939) (stating that the absolute
priority rule is the fixed principle for evaluating reorganization plans); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913) ("[A] transfer by stockholders from themselves to them-
selves cannot defeat the claim of a non-assenting creditor."); David Gray Carlson, Bankrupt-
cy's Organizing Principle, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 549, 606 (1999); G. Marcus Cole & Todd J.
Zywicki, Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: The New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bank-
ruptcy, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 511, 512 (stating that absolute priority has been a foundational
element of corporate reorganization since bankruptcy laws have existed in the United
States); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorgan-
izations, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 74-84 (1991) (describing the absolute priority rule as founda-
tional).
2 The absolute priority rule mandates that absent the consent of senior creditors, junior
creditors are entitled to no bankruptcy distribution unless and until senior creditors are paid
in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006).
3 David L. Buchbinder, A Practical Guide to Bankruptcy 311-14 (1990); David G. Epstein
et al., Bankruptcy § 11-25, at 839 (1993).
4 See, e.g., Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Pri-
ority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. Fin. 1457, 1468 (1990); Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 285, 299 (1990).
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tion of reorganization scholars for decades."' The incidence and magni-
tude of bankruptcy distributions not conforming to absolute priority are
repeatedly analyzed in both the legal and finance literature.6 Oftentimes
investigators explain why their results, when properly analyzed, did not
violate priority after all.' Deviations beg for correction.
Despite this perception that bankruptcy's priority rules are fixed, they
are in fact regularly contested. Important ones regularly change. Of
course, local priority disputes occur unremarkably: Courts routinely ap-
ply settled priority law to contested facts to resolve claims in particular
cases. But this commonplace phenomenon is not the process that we
have in mind. Beyond the normal science of litigation and negotiation
over the application of settled rules to particular facts, the process we
suggest involves changes in priority rules that affect distributional rights
globally. The bankruptcy process is in fact rife with rent-seeking, as
creditors and their professionals contest existing distribution rules and
seek categorical changes to improve their private bankruptcy returns.
Priority is not in fact absolute. It is often up for grabs.
This pursuit of priority change is continual and multi-dimensional,
fought in multiple legal forums-from the transactional lawyers' offices
to the bankruptcy courts to Congress. Investors, creditors, and managers
invent innovative transactions that enhance their priority. They persuade
judges that old priorities are wrong and new priorities are justified. And
they turn to Congress to legislate new priority rules. This rent-seeking
process is understood to be central to corporate law, securities law, and
financial regulation'-particularly when legislatures and administrative
5 Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and
the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 1930, 1930 (2006).
6 See, e.g., Brian L. Betker, Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and
Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 68 J. Bus. 161, 161 (1995)
(examining the cross-sectional determinants of absolute priority deviations in Chapter 11
bankruptcies); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S.
Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. Fin. 747, 768 (1989) (finding deviations from absolute priori-
ty); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 126
(1990) (analyzing deviations from absolute priority empirically).
See, e.g., Betker, supra note 6, at 162-63, 181-82 (arguing that shareholders' priority
jumps in Chapter 11 result from creditors' voluntary acquiescence to shareholders' demands
in order to speed up bankruptcy proceedings); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 143-58
(proposing several strategic explanations for priority jumps).
gRichard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 191,
197, 232-34 (2012); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and
the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1112-13 (2002).
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agencies are lobbied-but to date has not been central to our conceptual-
izations of bankruptcy. With this Article, we aim to remedy that defi-
ciency.
Recent years have witnessed important, successful priority jumps
through doctrinal innovations in the courts. Trade creditors now regular-
ly jump priority by persuading bankruptcy courts to designate them as
critical vendors to the debtor firm. This entitles them to early and full
payment of their pre-bankruptcy claims, instead of the pro rata "ten
cents on the dollar" that unsecured creditors conventionally receive in
the absence of any priority jump. At the same time, bank lenders have
convinced judges to "roll up" their possibly unsecured pre-bankruptcy
debts-debts that were quite likely not entitled to priority payment-into
new, secured, and highly-prioritized loans to the debtor in bankruptcy.'
Other interested parties have pursued priority jumping through private
ordering-sometimes within the formal bankruptcy process and some-
times outside it. For example, when debtors have sold business units
during the bankruptcy proceeding via Section 363 sales, favored credi-
tors have sometimes had their claims assumed by the acquirer as part of
the sale, effectively jumping ahead of the disfavored creditors left be-
hind.o Structured finance deals, crafted well before bankruptcy, enable
investor-creditors of debtor-sponsored special purpose vehicles to enjoy
priority over the debtor's other creditors should the firm find itself in
bankruptcy."
Creditors also go to Congress for favored treatment. The range and
impact of these congressional efforts have not been small nor have they
been economically unimportant: Legislative priority-jumping facilitated
the explosive growth of unstable financial techniques that preceded the
2007-2009 financial crisis. The massive derivatives market, for exam-
ple, owes its existence in part to Congress according super-priority to
critical parts of the derivative debt contract.12 Similarly, the gargantuan
9 See infra Subsection II.B.1.
10 Most § 363 sales do not proceed that way, but some do. See infra Subsection II.B.3.
" See infra Subsection II.B.4.
12 See Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 91, 95-99 (2005); Mark J. Roe, The Deriva-
tives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 541,
546-54 (2011); Timothy P.W. Sullivan, Comment, Swapped Disincentives: Will Clearing-
houses Mitigate the Unintended Effects of the Bankruptcy Code's Swap Exemptions?, 80
Fordham L. Rev. 1491, 1510-12 (2011); Bryan G. Faubus, Note, Narrowing the Bankruptcy
Safe Harbor for Derivatives to Combat Systemic Risk, 59 Duke L.J. 801, 820-23 (2010).
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repo market would not have been viable without the extra priorities
Congress accorded to repo debt, 3 which figured prominently in major
financial firm failures during the financial crisis. Early in the crisis, for
example, Bear Steams collapsed with an over-extended repo financing
structure, triggering a "run on repo," which imperiled a number of other
financial firms. 4 With a bankruptcy commission organized by the
American Bankruptcy Institute planning to submit a plan to Congress for
a new Bankruptcy Code within the next two years, 5 one can expect
more such rent-seeking to reveal itself.
Though the pursuit of priority jumps has become a regular activity for
bankruptcy lawyers, lobbyists, and interested creditor groups, scholars
and policy makers have not yet analyzed the generality of this rent-
seeking activity or incorporated it into our conceptualization of bank-
ruptcy. Instead, bankruptcy's standard positive and normative conceptu-
alization is contractarian, 6 viewing bankruptcy as in fact, or aspiration-
ally, a hypothetical creditors' bargain: "a system designed to mirror the
agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves
were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante posi-
tion.,17 Under this framework, inter-creditor priorities in bankruptcy
13 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, Brook-
ings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2010, at 261, 276-77, available at http://www.brookings.
edu/-/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall%202010/2010b bpea-gorton.pdf; see also infra Subsection
II.C.1. Agreements to repurchase securities, known in the trade as "repos," are common fi-
nancing mechanisms. A firm finances a security that it owns by simultaneously selling it and
agreeing to repurchase it later.
14 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 276-77; see also Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick,
Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 425, 447-48 (2012). The repos
get super-priority in bankruptcy, facilitating their widespread use. Overnight repo financing
of heavily-leveraged firms, such as Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and MF Global, makes
them more fragile, and subject to rapid failure.
1s Robert J. Keach & Albert Togut, Commission to Explore Overhauling Chapter 11, 30
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 36, 36, 38 (2011).
16 Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 17 (1986) [hereinafter
Jackson, Logic and Limits]; Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127, 127-28 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857, 860, 866-67 (1982)
[hereinafter Jackson, Creditors' Bargain]; Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Na-
ture of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L.
Rev. 155, 155-56, 160 (1989); Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 542-45 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki, A
Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 741, 742-44
(2004); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J.
1807, 1819-20 (1998).
17 Jackson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 16, at 860.
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generally mirror their priorities as state law creates them outside of
bankruptcy.18 Bankruptcy creates further priorities only to the extent
necessary for the collective proceeding that implements the creditors'
bargain to succeed.19
That the reality of rent-seeking remains unexamined is unsurprising.
The notion that priority could be regularly up for grabs across multiple
forums clashes with the more congenial conventional view of bankrupt-
cy as a court-centered contract enforcement mechanism, honoring the
debtor's obligations according to established non-bankruptcy priorities
to the extent the debtor's limited pool of value allows. We contend,
however, that priority jumping is core to the normal science of corporate
reorganization.
Rather than viewing Chapter 11 as a set-piece application of fixed
priority rules within bankruptcy courts, the bankruptcy process should
be seen as a continuing struggle among creditor groups to break priority,
both within and outside the courts. Priority jumps are not isolated or idi-
osyncratic. We document their regularity in recent years, and we revisit
several historically important priority jumps. Pursuing or maintaining
priority jumps is a staple activity among organized creditor groups and
their professionals. These regular changes to bankruptcy priority not on-
ly alter bankruptcy distributions but also attract resources in the com-
petitive pursuit of further favor from Congress and the courts. Priority
jumps beget more priority-jumping activity,20 either by successful credi-
tors seeking more or by recently jumped creditors seeking to reverse or
minimize their loss from the latest priority jump. 2 1
It may seem counterintuitive to conceptualize priority-jumping activi-
ty as part of the normal science of corporate restructuring. After all, poli-
tics occurs in Congress, while bankruptcy practice occurs in the courts,
or in the conference rooms where deals are made and companies are fi-
18 See Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 16, at 22 ("[I]n its role as a collective debt-
collection device, bankruptcy law should not create rights. Instead, it should act to ensure
that the rights that exist are vindicated to the extent possible.").
19 Id. at 153 (explaining why the administrative expense priority is justified in creditors'
bargain terms).2oSee Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking 70-74 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 1993).
21 See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 452 B.R. 31, 35-37, 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(denying parties' efforts to alter derivatives priority); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 439 B.R.
811, 834-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting creditor's effort to validate triangular deriva-
tives setoff as permissible under § 560); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868, 874 (7th Cir.
2004).
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nanced. This court-centered, deal-oriented perspective is an artifact of
bankruptcy's institutional setting. Other business-based administrative
processes are run not by courts but by government agencies that regular-
ly interact with affected constituencies and Congress, and typically act
through public rulemaking processes. Rent-seeking in this setting is
common and often transparent.22 In securities regulation and financial
regulation-kindred fields to corporate reorganization-the affected pri-
vate parties and their lawyers regularly lobby public officials to shape
broad-based rules. Administrative agencies like the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the banking regulators are headed by political
appointees. The regulators effectively report to Congress, on which they
depend for their budgets. In contrast, courts run the bankruptcy process.
No one doubts that the financial industry is deeply involved in construct-
ing financial law and regulation. But the courts are removed from the
political process; they make rules primarily as a byproduct of litigation.
So it seems natural to view bankruptcy as a court-centered, largely apo-
litical process-one susceptible to a largely contractarian understanding
based on fixed rules.
But both courts and Congress have entertained all manner of priority-
jumping proposals in recent decades and have acted on many. Rent-
seeking efforts play no solid institutional favorites, occurring in every
setting from which bankruptcy priority rules issue--contracting, litigat-
ing, and legislating.23
We briefly consider the consequences of jumping priority, from both
efficiency and political economy perspectives. A priority jump can lead
to more efficient risk allocation. Creditors disadvantaged by a priority
jump adjust,2 4 realizing that they face greater credit risk than before the
jump because a newly favored creditor has moved ahead in the line for
repayment. The jumped creditors adjust over time, in a manner
understood formally in the famous-in-finance, Nobel Prize-winning
Modigliani-Miller irrelevance propositions. But if the jumped creditors
adjust more slowly than the nimble jumping creditors, value transfers
22 Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and
Why 166-89 (2009).
23 On rent-seeking efforts generally, see Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 291 (1974) (modeling the costs of competitive
rent-seeking).
24 Stockholders are typically out of the picture in a major modem bankruptcy, regardless of
creditor priorities.
2013] 1241
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occur and such jumps make for winners and losers. Often creditors
adjust by rushing to join the favored creditor classes. The resulting
financing patterns can change firms' financial structures, sometimes for
the worse.25 If priority jumps favor short-term creditors, for example,
then firms will end up with more short-term, often unstable, credit.
This process can, however, be efficient if the cheaper credit from
jumping priority derives from lenders' lowered costs of evaluating, mon-
itoring, and managing credit portfolios, and if those benefits outweigh
the costs that the disfavored creditors incur plus the social losses from
creditors pursuing priority jumps in the first place. 26 Hence, some priori-
ty jumps will be efficient, some inefficient. On the inefficiency side of
the ledger, creditors may seek a priority jump, not because of its ultimate
transactional efficiency, but because they can react quickly and shift
losses to less nimble creditors or because they enjoy a comparative ad-
vantage in obtaining priority in one decisional forum or another. The
less nimble may suffer from institutional or cognitive scleroses that im-
pede them from reacting rapidly and effectively. The overall costs of
priority-seeking may therefore not be trivial. Especially when the pro-
cess becomes competitive, the total cost spent pursuing and contesting
priority jumps may swamp any efficiency gains from streamlined credit
provisions.27
Many, perhaps most, priority jumps in recent years show strong indi-
cia of having been inefficient overall, even if some were locally efficient
in one deal or another. Too many resemble the classic rent-seeking story
applied to the costs of monopolization: If monopoly profits are high
enough, social resources will be over-spent as parties pay for a chance of
obtaining those monopoly profits. 28 We offer examples of priority jump-
ing in which rent-seeking costs are likely to have dominated any transac-
tional efficiencies. While we do not seek to evaluate fully the efficiency
implications of priority jumping, there is good reason to surmise that it
generates many inefficiencies and that priority jumping contributed to
25 Cf. Roe, supra note 12, at 542 (analyzing how the Bankruptcy Code's superpriority pro-
visions incentivize risky pre-bankruptcy strategies).
26 On the costs of rent-seeking, see generally Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Socie-
ty (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) and The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking
(Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988).
27 See Krueger, supra note 23, at 295, 302.28 Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807,
807 (1975); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
Econ. J. 224, 228-32 (1967).
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the emergence and explosive growth of unstable financial techniques
that contributed to the severity of the 2007-2009 economic crisis.
A roadmap for this Article: In Part I, we will outline baseline absolute
priority. We will show how fixed priority is central to the conventional
static conceptualization of bankruptcy. In Part II, we will explain the in-
tegrated process of bankruptcy rent-seeking, which incorporates transac-
tional innovation, doctrinal innovation through litigation, and legislative
lobbying that produces new law. We will also recount recent priority-
jumping episodes, showing that every major creditor type has contested
priority in recent decades. We situate these numerous priority jumps
within our political economic. framework. In Part III, we will explore the
implications of breaking priority, conceptualizing the findings from Part
II. Bankruptcy, rather than just effecting a contractarian creditors' bar-
gain, is a rent-seeking process, one with deep and wide inefficiencies.
Lastly, we will conclude. Creditors regularly attempt to break bankrupt-
cy priority, and they often succeed. Breaking priority, reacting to the
break, and counterattacking to restore a lost priority are all central fea-
tures of modem bankruptcy practice. Without understanding the bank-
ruptcy rent-seeking, priority-jumping process, we cannot fully under-
stand or reform corporate reorganization to make it as efficient and as
fair as possible.
I. BASIC PRIORITY
A. The Bankruptcy Code's Basics
The Bankruptcy Code's core principle is that distribution conforms to
predetermined statutory and contractual priorities, with creditor equality
within each priority class.29 Creditors cannot jump out of their class to
obtain more value; they receive payment only after higher-ranking credi-
tors are paid. The Code formally defers to state law priorities. For exam-
ple, secured creditors' state-created priority allows them to be paid out
of their state-based property interest in their collateral, to the exclusion
of the debtor's unsecured creditors. 30 Other creditors may agree by con-
29 See Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 147 (1940) (stat-
ing that "a [class] composition would not be confirmed where one creditor was obtaining
some special favor or inducement not accorded the others, whether that consideration moved
from the debtor or from another").
30 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
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tract to be paid only after more senior creditors are fully paid.3 ' These
subordination arrangements are common. Bankruptcy-specific rules pri-
oritize favored creditors, such as tax authorities and employees claiming
unpaid back wages,3 2 as well as offering priority to the post-bankruptcy
suppliers of credit, goods, and services necessary to rehabilitate the
debtor. As bankruptcy distribution moves down the priority ladder, it
eventually reaches the first unfortunate class that does not receive full
payment; creditors in this class share proportionately in the value re-
maining,34 and lower priority classes receive nothing.
Section 129(b) enacts these priority concepts, embodying the abso-
lute priority rule. A creditor class that is not paid in full under a plan is
entitled to have the judge rule that no lower-ranking claimant or equity
interest may be paid a dime, and that no similarly situated creditor may
be paid proportionately more. The bankruptcy judge is barred from
confirming a proposed plan that violates either priority feature over the
objection of the not-paid-in-full creditor class.
Conceptually, this statutory structure is unexceptional. The Bankrupt-
cy Code crisply and clearly sets up this priority scheme and the propor-
tionate sharing of insufficient assets." Creditors in a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding understand the priority ladder and come to terms with one
another, resolving and compromising contractual and situational ambi-
guities and cross-claims to present a plan of reorganization for the bank-
ruptcy judge to approve.3 9 If claimants cannot agree on the facts, terms,
" Id. § 5 10(a).
32 Id. § 507(a).
3 Id. §§ 364, 503.
34 Id. §§ 507(a), 1129(a).
35 The statute's formal language is:
[T]he court .. . shall confirm the plan [over the objection of a creditor only] if the plan
does not discriminate unfairly, and . .. (i) . .. the plan provides that each [dissenting
creditor] receive or retain . . . property of a value . .. equal to the allowed amount of
such claim; or (ii) [all] junior[s to the dissenting creditor] will not receive or re-
tain . .. any property ....
Id. § 1129(b). The bar to the reorganization plan "discriminat[ing] unfairly" gets its content
elsewhere. It requires that incompletely compensated creditors either consent or have their
claims paid ratably with similarly situated creditors. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 415-18
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6371-74.
6 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006) (plan cannot discriminate unfairly); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595,
at 415-18.
37 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2006).
38 Id. §§ 726, 1129.
39 See id. §§ 1126, 1129(a)(8).
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or validity of the pre-bankruptcy priorities, the court resolves the ambi-
guities. If the proposed plan accords with the priority principle, with rat-
able sharing of losses among similarly situated creditors, then the bank-
ruptcy judge approves the plan, cramming it down on any recalcitrant
creditors who object to a plan that accords them their appropriate priori-
ty. Indeed, policymakers see bankruptcy priority as fundamental to
sound business, with bankruptcy's fundamental goal being to
"[e]stablish[] a single, clear hierarchy of payments." 4 0 This clear hierar-
chy is needed to facilitate a rapid reorganization of the failed firm in
bankruptcy, as well as to facilitate smooth financing outside bankruptcy,
by telling creditors in advance how the too-small pie will be divided if
the firm cannot pay all of its financiers.
The contractarian principles at the foundation of absolute priority,
hence, are simple.
B. Some Code Refinements
The Code articulates priority-related refinements beyond the basic
rule of absolute priority. For example, for secured creditors, a mecha-
nism is needed to ascertain whether their security is good;4 1 the court
must value the security in close cases. For new post-bankruptcy lenders
to the cash-starved enterprise, their priority must be established. (They
rank, with some exceptions, prior to all pre-existing creditors.4 2) Similar-
ly, post-bankruptcy suppliers would hesitate to supply needed services,
raw materials, or machinery unless they are assured of payment. The
Code offers such assurance. 4 3 Specialized provisions govern the priori-
ties for pension claims and mass tort claims.44
With these refinements, then, the Code effects a largely contractarian
structure of claim priority.
Bankruptcy can thus be seen as a set of fixed priority rules into which
creditors organize themselves. Most organize themselves via contract;
40 Elena Cirmizi et al., The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform, 27 World Bank Res. Ob-
server 185, 188-89 (2012) (emphasis omitted); cf. 1 Max Weber, Economy and Society 43,
327-29, 336-37 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fishcoff et al. trans., 1978)
(noting that commerce depends on uniform, stable rules and standards).
41 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
42 Id. §§ 364, 503, 507. To the cognoscenti, these are the DIP (for debtor-in-possession)
lender provisions.
43 Id. §§ 503(b), 507(a).
" Id. § § 524(g), 1113, 1114.
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statute accords priority to a few, typically noncontracting, parties like
tax authorities and tort claimants. Once organized, the players take on
their assigned risks, and if the enterprise suffers, their pre-set priorities
determine their distributions and losses in the ensuing bankruptcy.
II. PRIORITY JUMPING AND ITS POLITICAL ECONOMY
The basic priority structure detailed above is conventionally viewed
as fixed and static. We now counter that view, showing priority to be
very much in flux. It is hard to find a basic priority rule that has not been
pressured in recent decades, with many being altered or replaced. We do
not evaluate the efficiency of any priority jump in this Part-an issue we
will take up in Part III. Instead, we demonstrate that priority jumping is
widespread, and we locate priority jumps within a general political
economy framework. We recount recent priority jumps to support our
claim that priority jumping is an important facet of bankruptcy's normal
science.45 Bankruptcy reorganization should be characterized as a rent-
seeking process as much as a contractual, financial process. The latter
facet is now well understood; the former is not yet even part of the dis-
cussion.
A. An Integrated Process ofBankruptcy Rent-Seeking
Priority jumping costs something to creditors who pursue it.4 6 They
hire expensive attorneys to design complex private arrangements for
bankruptcy proofing-for example, special purpose vehicles ("SPVs"),
which are elaborately constructed contractual priority jumps-and roll-
up debtor-in-possession ("DIP") loans, through which a creditor has its
nonpriority pre-bankruptcy loans rolled into prioritized post-bankruptcy
loans. Creditors pay attorneys to argue for the doctrinal changes that
bring about court-created priority jumps. And creditors pay to lobby
45 For brevity's sake, we relegate further examples of priority jumping to the Appendix.
46 In the efficiency-oriented analysis, these monopolies transfer value from consumers to
producers, and they reduce overall social value because, to get that transfer, the monopolist
must reduce production below what it could produce profitably and raise price beyond what
it really needs to charge. That lost production is the social cost of monopoly, in the tradition-
al rendition. See Tim Hazledine, Oligopoly and Rent-seeking: Cowling and Mueller Revisit-
ed, in Competition, Monopoly and Corporate Governance: Essays in Honour of Keith Cowl-
ing 141 (Michael Waterson ed., 2003); Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social
Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 Econ. J. 727, 744-46 (1978); Posner, supra note 28, at 807;
Tullock, supra note 28, at 228.
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Congress when these other approaches fail. We can think of these three
mechanisms-innovative transactions, doctrinal mutation, and legisla-
tive lobbying-as a single integrated rent-seeking process. The process
is not unique to bankruptcy, but it is not accorded the weight and analy-
sis for bankruptcy that it receives elsewhere.
Rent-seeking via priority jumping is typically socially costly, as it is
in other contexts, such as monopolization. Efficient competitors can
sometimes capture an entire market and monopolize it, because no other
competitor can provide as good a product. But inefficient competitors
can monopolize a market as well by lobbying legislatures for exclusive
privileges. Examples abound, from the trading privileges of the East In-
dia Trading Company of long ago to the licensing privileges in tele-
communications of recent decades. The costs of monopolies include
more than just the pricing, production, and resource allocation distor-
tions they cause. When multiple competitors see potential monopoly
profits, they will invest in mechanisms to obtain and preserve them-
lobbying, excessive price wars, and so on. These costs are also social
costs of monopoly.
Transactional innovation can be the cheapest way to pursue a priority
jump. If a new type of credit transaction accords priority to the lender in
a way that the borrower's preexisting creditors had not expected, then it
is priority jumping. Existing creditors suffer a loss as they bear more
risk with no commensurate price adjustment. The new lender (and often
the firm's owners) transfers value from the older creditors to itself.
Crafting a new transactional structure is likely to be cheap relative to
litigating or lobbying for a jump. If the transactional adjustment "takes"
and is left unchallenged, the priority-seeker wins. If the priority seeker's
innovation is challenged, then the priority seeker can seek validation in
court. If successful, the priority-seeking creditor jumps ahead of other
creditors. For example, a weak pre-bankruptcy loan might not be paid in
full unless it is rolled up into a post-petition, highly prioritized debtor-
in-possession loan. Creditors that persuade courts to permit roll-upsjump their priority. 47
Bankruptcy litigation may be a messy process, however, in terms of
exploring and establishing (or opposing) new priority jumps. Losers
47 See infra Subsection II.B.1.
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rarely appeal from bankruptcy court decisions, 48 so that different bank-
ruptcy courts may have differing views about the validity of particular
attempted priority jumps. Working out the differences takes time and re-
sources in litigation, given the dearth of appeals that might offer doctri-
nal clarity.
When transactional innovation and litigation fail in delivering or de-
feating priority jumps with sufficient clarity for the combatants, old-
fashioned legislative or regulatory lobbying may hold promise for priori-
ty jumping. Lobbying for special treatment is common in bankruptcy
legislation. For example, multiple specific exemptions from the Code's
automatic stay have been enacted. 49 Legislative action for repo and de-
rivatives transactions offers another major example. In the 1980s, finan-
cial creditors sought super-priority for repo financing, as well as exemp-
tion from the bankruptcy stay and the other inconveniences that secured
lenders face."o They characterized their short-term repo loans as sales of
securities (which they would repurchase the following day)." If the
transaction were deemed a true sale-though functionally, it was a
loan-then the lender would enjoy priority and other advantages greater
48 Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 1063, 1091-92 (1994); David A. Levin, Comment, Precedent and the As-
sertion of Bankruptcy Court Autonomy: Efficient or Arrogant?, 12 Bankr. Dev. J. 185, 205-
06 (1995). The Code makes many bankruptcy court determinations effectively unappealable,
in that once the underlying transaction is approved by the bankruptcy court, the transaction
will not be overturned even if the appeal succeeds. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(m), 364(e)
(2006). Losers need to get the courts to stay implementation of the bankruptcy ruling while
they appeal, usually on an expedited basis. The appellate courts may shrink from issuing rap-
id decisions in a highly-pressured atmosphere, when the courts would have little time to
study the approved transaction.
49 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006) (automatic stay does not apply to lessors' or pur-
chase-money lenders' efforts to retake aircraft equipment); id. § 362(b)(3) (automatic stay
does not apply to efforts to perfect or maintain perfection of security interests in real proper-
ty); id. § 362(b)(10) (automatic stay does not apply to lessor's efforts to reclaim nonresiden-
tial real property after expiration of lease); id. §§ 362(b)(20)-(21) (automatic stay does not
protect real property from debtor engaging in serial filings); id. § 362(d)(4) (court may lift
automatic stay for creditor secured by interest in real property if, after notice and hearing,
court finds filing of petition was designed to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors); id. § 365(n)
(licensee of debtor's intellectual property may retain its rights under contract with debtor-
licensor, even if debtor rejects contract).
so See id. §§ 362(b)(17), 362(b)(27), 560 (derivative and repo counterparties may liquidate
collateral in their possession); id. §§ 546(g), 546(j) (exemption from preference rules); id.
§§ 546(g), 546(j) (exemption from constructive fraudulent conveyance liability); id. §§ 555,
559-561 (exemption from debtor's § 365 option to affirm or reject executory contracts).
51 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repurchase Agree-
ments Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 Syracuse L. Rev. 999, 1005 (1996).
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than conventional secured lenders. Attempts at cheap transactional
changes came first, but early courts held the transaction to be nothing
more than a secured loan.52 Having lost too much of the rent-seeking lit-
igation, the financial players-already organized and influential because
financial regulation is deeply imbued with rent-seeking-turned to Con-
gress for their priority, which they obtained.
Legislative rent-seeking is immediately familiar to those who study
financial market regulation. Banks seek to influence rules on mortgage
lending or capital requirements or derivatives trading.53 Investment ad-
visers, hedge funds, and broker-dealers all expend resources trying to af-
fect the contours of their regulatory constraints.5 4 They seek these bene-
fits from Congress and regulatory agencies. Even closer to corporate
bankruptcy in this rent-seeking dimension is corporate lawmaking,
where we now understand rent-seeking to be integral. In the last dec-
ade's reform of shareholder voting, for example, different groups sought
favor from different legislative environments: Public pensions and funds
sought privileged access to the shareholder voting machinery through
administrative channels," and managers pursued their most friendly
state legislature for a shareholder voting environment congenial to
them.56
We elaborate these themes through concrete examples in the follow-
ing two sections. In Section B we will discuss the first two rent-seeking
channels, examining several major and minor transactional priority
jumps that occurred prior to the financial crisis, as well as related litiga-
tion in some cases that affirmed, refined, or rejected transactional inno-
52 Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 23 B.R. 165, 166
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
53 See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 Stan. L. Rev.
191, 233-34 (2012); Victoria McGrane, New Capital Rules Likely for Banks, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 27, 2011, at Cl; Peter Eavis, Parsing Bank Lobbyists' Dire Warnings on Derivatives
Rules, N.Y. Times DealBook (May 1, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
05/01/parsing-bank-lobbyists-dire-warnings-on-derivatives-rules; Christine Harper et al.,
Wall Street Stealth Lobby Defends $35 Billion Derivatives Haul, Bloomberg (Aug. 30, 2009,
7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=agFM-w6e2iO0.
54 See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying: Securities and Investment Industry Profile
2012, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=F7&year-2012; Ben Protess,
Wall Street Continues to Spend Big on Lobbying, N.Y. Times DealBook (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:33
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/wall-street-continues-to-spend-big-on-lobbying.
5 Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics,
and the Law, 65 Bus. Law. 361, 365 (2010).
5 Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder's Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware
and in Washington, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2012).
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vations. In Section C, we will discuss rent-seeking in Congress before
the financial crisis, focusing on the special bankruptcy treatment for re-
purchase financing and derivatives.
B. Transactional Innovation and Litigation
Four important priority jumps illustrate the interplay of transactional
strategy and litigation challenge in the rough and tumble of bankruptcy
rent-seeking-the DIP lender's roll-up priority, critical-vendor priority,
unsecured-creditor priority in sales of entire firms under Section 363 of
the Code, and priority for structured-finance transactions. Each has been
important to bankruptcy practitioners, bankruptcy analysts, and the
bankruptcy process. We describe these priority jumps and the rent-
seeking processes through which they were created.
1. The DIP Lender's Priority Jump
Bankrupt companies have typically run out of cash by the time they
file for reorganization in Chapter 11. To keep their operations going-to
meet the next week's payroll-the company usually needs a rapid, major
infusion of fresh cash. But those with cash are wary of lending to the
bankrupt, especially if they would have to compete with pre-existing
creditors for repayment. The Bankruptcy Code facilitates these new
debtor-in-possession loans by requiring that they be repaid before pre-
bankruptcy debt.57 (The debtor-in-possession is the bankrupt company,
after it has filed for bankruptcy; the debtor-in-possession lender is the
financier who provides the bankrupt with new cash to operate.) In these
terms, such priority for the new lender is unexceptional. It is not priority
jumping, but a practice of long standing: New credit often commands
special priority."
s 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 1129(a)(9) (2006). This is not to say that these loans' priority is with-
out controversy. If the bankrupt debtor wastes the cash and the new lender is repaid anyway,
this priority process wastes social value and is paid for by the pre-bankruptcy creditors. Be-
yond ordinary priority for the new lender is the extent of its priority. The Code anticipated
that in unusual circumstances, the new lender's priority could extend into the assets of preex-
isting secured creditors. See id. § 364(d). What was once unusual has become more com-
monplace in recent years.
58 See, e.g., id. § 726(b) (prioritizing the administrative expenses incurred in a Chapter 7
case over the administrative expenses from any prior Chapter 11, 12, or 13 proceeding that
converted to the Chapter 7 case).
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Sometimes the post-bankruptcy lender seeks and obtains more than its
basic priority entitlement." Often it had already lent to the firm before
the bankruptcy and sees weaknesses in its pre-bankruptcy loan that put
that loan at risk-a potential for collateral inadequacy, for example, or
another legal challenge to the claimed fully secured status of the pre-
bankruptcy loan. This lender offers additional credit via the post-
bankruptcy DIP loan, but insists that its potentially problematic pre-
bankruptcy loan be rolled up into-essentially paid off by-the new,
prioritized DIP loan. 60 At the time of filing, the company needs, say,
$100 million in cash. The lender already has $50 million outstanding on
its weak pre-bankruptcy loan, so the lender agrees to a fresh loan of
$150 million, all of it advantaged by the super-priority sections of the
Code for DIP loans. The parties understand (or the contract requires)
that the debtor will immediately draw $50 million of the prioritized DIP
loan to pay off the weak $50 million pre-bankruptcy loan. By extin-
guishing the pre-bankruptcy loan in this way, the payoff "rolls up" the
$50 million amount into the highly prioritized DIP loan, effectively con-
verting the DIP lender's (likely) undersecured pre-bankruptcy loan into
a fully secured postpetition claim. This is priority jumping.
In theory, the old loan may be fully secured and therefore would
have been paid in full anyway.61 For that sure-to-be-repaid loan, the
roll-up is simply a matter of convenience, allowing the bankrupt debtor
and the creditor to manage a single lending facility. On the other hand,
if the security is weak, the deficiency ought to have become an ordi-
nary unsecured loan,62 which is rarely repaid in full. But in a roll-up,
5 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Defender Drug
Stores), 145 B.R. 312, 316 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) ("Bankruptcy courts... have regularly
authorized postpetition financing arrangements containing lender incentives beyond the ex-
plicit priorities and liens specified in section 364."); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter
11, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 19, 57 n.178 (2004) ("Presumably, the validity of the remedies
relies on the bankruptcy judge's powers of equity arising inherently and from § 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 105(a) states that '[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title 11] .... " (al-
teration in original) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000))).
60 Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 663, 707 n.209 (2009) ("'Roll-ups' are arrangements whereby prepetition se-
cured claims are converted to postpetition secured claims. This conversion is advantageous
to the secured creditor primarily because prepetition claims may be subject to avoidance and
restructuring, whereas postpetition claims, invariably, are not . . .
61 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 1123 (2006).
61 See id. § 506.
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the bankruptcy process often does not examine the old collateral's ad-
equacy and the old loan's bona fides carefully. 63 Sometimes the pro-
cess doesn't examine them at all. There is a priority jump to the extent
some portion of the pre-bankruptcy loan would not otherwise have
been paid. Figure 1 illustrates.
Figure 1: Comparing DIP Loans With and Without Roll-up
Postipetition DIP credit required $100 MM
Undersecured $50MM prepetition loan
secured by $30MMcollateral
Conventional DIP Loan DIP Loan with Roll-up
$100MM DIP Loanr $15OMM DIP Loan:
fully secured, prioritized under § 364 fully secured, prioritize under § 364
Undersecuredprepldon loan majfectal Prepetktnloanpaidinfut$20MVpriority ans
oS30MM counateral o\
SSOMM initial draw
Pays prepcm=o I=s i n 5210z MUnsecured $20ALMgeneralvasecured + $1OOMM credit
claim in bankruptcy
Pro rata payment
with other unsecured claims
V.
Payment in full
Figure 1 compares DIP loans with and without a roll-up. The roll-up feature
here alters priorities and distribution. The lender's prepetition security is insuf-
ficient to cover the prepetition loan value, with the insufficiency at $20 million.
Without a roll-up, under Section 506, the lender would have a $30 million se-
cured claim, which would typically be paid in full, and a $20 million unsecured
claim, which would only be paid proportionately with other unsecured credi-
tors. It would rarely be paid in full, because the bankrupt firm usually lacks
enough value to pay all of its creditors. However, the extent and existence of
63 James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev.
139, 182-83 (2004) ("Some rollups are noisy. In some cases the DIP lender pays off the ex-
isting loan in full. That payment is treated as the first advance on the post-petition secured
loan . ... No one could miss that event." (citation omitted)); see also Craig R. Bucki, Crack-
ing the Code: The Legal Authority Behind Extrastatutory Debtor-In-Possession Financing
Mechanisms and Their Prospects for Survival, 2005 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 357, 372; Marcia
L. Goldstein et al., Current Issues in Debtor in Possession Financing (Chapter 11 Business
Reoganizations, ALI-ABA Course of Study) SJ082 ALI-ABA 29, 40 (2004) (noting that
courts have enforced roll-ups "[d]espite judicial reservations" and limited clarification about
their enforceability).
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the shortfall are uncertain and not visible to the court without an extensive val-
uation process. With the roll-up, the debtor borrows $150 million from the
same lender after the debtor files for bankruptcy. Fifty million of the $150 mil-
lion DIP loan is used to pay off the entirety of debtor's pre-bankruptcy loan, as
though it were fully secured. This process jumps the lender's shortfall up from
partially-paid to fully-paid status.
Roll-up financing nicely illustrates both transactional innovation to
jump priority and the litigation that often follows. Roll-up priority
evolved through an iterative hit-and-miss approach involving both trans-
actional innovation and spurts of litigation. Before roll-ups, DIP lenders
tried cross-collateralization, a more transparent way of pursuing secured
status for undersecured pre-bankruptcy loans. With cross-
collateralization, the DIP lender insisted as part of its DIP financing deal
that the collateral securing the DIP loan would also secure its pre-
bankruptcy loan. To the extent the DIP loan collateral included assets
that did not already secure the pre-bankruptcy loan, cross-
collateralization gave extra collateral to the old pre-bankruptcy loan.
Once in bankruptcy, however, debtors are typically not freely permitted
to give new collateral for pre-bankruptcy loans.
It was no surprise that unsecured creditors, disadvantaged by cross-
collateralization, challenged its permissibility, and cross-collateralization
suffered a checkered fate in the courts. Though a few lower courts reluc-
tantly upheld DIP financing cross-collateralized with the lender's pre-
bankruptcy loans,64 two important court of appeals decisions found it im-
permissible.
Once it became clear to lenders and their lawyers that bankruptcy
courts would not regularly countenance cross-collateralization, these
lenders innovated with the roll-up structure. The roll-up device then
had to be litigated as well, with junior creditors objecting to their fur-
ther subordination below the DIP lender's pre-bankruptcy deficiency
6 See In re Roblin Indus., 52 B.R. 241, 246-47 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Vanguard
Diversified, Inc., 31 BR. 364, 367 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Borne Chem. Co. v. Lincoln
First Commercial Corp. (In re Borne Chem. Co.), 9 B.R. 263, 270 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981).
65 See Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F 2d 1490, 1494-95
(11th Cir. 1992) (holding cross-collateralization impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code
because it is not authorized under § 364 and directly conflicts with the established Code pri-
ority scheme); Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d
1092, 1097-98 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding cross-collateralization impermissible under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which preceded the current Bankruptcy Code).
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claim.66 Through this series of innovations and court contests, both
proponents and objectors hired and paid their lawyers, creating a sort
of arms race of priority jumping and defense.
Finally, even after roll-up priority became routinely granted in the
courts, other creditors countered with their own priority jumping innova-
tion. As we will discuss below, SPV lending emerged to enable lenders
to trump the roll-up and other special priorities that DIP lenders enjoy.6 8
This evolution of changing priorities illustrates the leapfrogging, rent-
seeking process and attendant costs that priority jumping may trigger.
Lawyers for would-be SPV lenders produced a transactional innovation
that sidestepped some of the hard-won priority gains DIP lenders with
prebankruptcy loans had achieved through their own lawyers' creative
transactional and litigation strategies.
And as with arms races generally, pursuit by one group will typi-
cally trigger defensive measures by opposing groups, affecting their
relative standing but perhaps not generating any transactional effi-
ciencies.
2. The Critical Vendor's Priority Jump
Suppliers often ship inventory and raw materials to their customers on
credit-with payment due, say, at the end of the month. If the customer
files for bankruptcy before it pays the supplier, the unpaid supplier has a
general unsecured claim against the bankrupt, which is entitled to no
66 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware permits roll-ups, but
only where they are identified in the motion to approve financing and are justified. Del.
Bankr. L.R. 4001-2(a)(i). The Southern District of New York requires a hearing to approve a
roll-up. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. LBR 4001-2. Other courts permit them but are skeptical. See
Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank (In re Sun Runner Marine), 945 F.2d 1089,
1095 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he use of financing to pay a prepetition unsecured debt is to be
used only in extreme cases."); In re Equalnet Commc'ns Corp., 258 B.R. 368, 369, 371
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000) (denying DIP financing that utilized roll-up but permitting certain
pre etition claims to be paid during automatic stay).
See Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83 Am. Econ.
Rev. Papers & Proceedings 409, 409 (1993).
68 See infra Subsection II.B.4. A priming lien gives the new money DIP lender in bank-
ruptcy a security interest in assets senior to any pre-existing liens on those assets. It is
specifically authorized under § 364(d) and is therefore not a priority jump for purposes of
our analysis.
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special priority.69 It gets pro rata payment with other unsecured credi-
tors, but no more than that.70
In recent years, however, the practice emerged of the debtor identify-
ing a class of pre-bankruptcy vendors as critical to its continuing opera-
tions. It sought and often obtained court approval to pay those vendors'
pre-bankruptcy claims in full in cash, as prioritized administrative ex-
penses.n This approval came early in the bankruptcy case to assure that
these critical vendors would continue supplying the debtor.72 Conceptu-
ally, this prioritization often makes sense: the goodwill from paying em-
ployees or employee-like claimants (like the night-time cleaning service
or the local electrician) in full should, if the business judgment is done
well, benefit the bankrupt overall.
From that conceptual core, the critical vendor practice mushroomed,
with critical vendor (and roll-up) orders disposing of major portions of
estate value. In the bankruptcy of Kmart, for example, $300 million of
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006); see also Mark A. McDermott, Critical Vendor and Re-
lated Orders: Kmart and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 14 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 409, 409 (2006) ("A business that files a petition under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code ... generally may not make any payments or other dis-
tributions on account of pre-petition claims except pursuant to a plan of reorganization that
has been confirmed by a bankruptcy court.").
70 Exceptions exist. Section 546(c) permits a seller to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent
provided that the reclamation claim satisfies the Code's requirements. This right derives
from the common law (later codified in U.C.C. § 2-702), which presumed that when the sell-
er sold to an insolvent buyer, the buyer had concealed the insolvency, defrauding the seller.
See, e.g., Conyers v. Ennis, 6 Fed. Cas. 377, 378 (D.R.I. 1821) (No. 3,149); Hall v. Naylor,
18 N.Y. 588, 589 (1859). Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code provides vendors with
an administrative expense for the value of goods received by the debtor within the twenty
days before the debtor's petition. Section 503(b)(9) is particularly advantageous to vendors
because classifying vendors' claims as administrative expenses affords vendors full payment
of the claim on the effective date of the plan, not a pro rata share of the claim's value. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(9), 507(a)(2), 1129(a)(9)(A) (2006).
71 See, e.g., In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981) (authoriz-
ing payment to creditors under "necessity of payment" doctrine where payment "is in the
interest of all parties . .. [and] will facilitate the continuing operation of the [bankrupt]"); In
re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824 (D. Del. 1999); In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R.
468, 469 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001). See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy I 105.02[4][a]
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) (1979).
72 The bankrupt can buy new supplies to keep the factory running, with the suppliers' new
credit to the bankrupt entitled to priority over the pre-bankruptcy debts. See § 503(b).
7 See Lynn M. LoPucki & Christopher R. Mirick, Strategies for Creditors in Bankruptcy
Proceedings § 10.03[E], at 423 (4th ed. 2003) ("Although some courts have criticized distri-
butions to prepetition creditors other than pursuant to a confirmed plan as being inconsistent
with the Bankruptcy Code, these payments are increasingly being authorized early in the
case . . . ." (citation omitted)).
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the debtor's $2 billion DIP financing was ordered to be paid out in criti-
cal vendor payments just as the bankruptcy commenced.7 4 These early
and substantial payouts disfavored other unsecured creditors and were
difficult to appeal, coming so early in the case as they did and depending
on factual judgments as to whether estate value was enhanced. It would
also have been administratively difficult for an appellate court to order
the recovery of these numerous small payments after the fact.
In Kmart, disfavored creditors appealed nevertheless, arguing that the
critical vendor designation was too broad, involving too many ordinary
suppliers. In the Kmart appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit explained how critical vendor payments could, with diffi-
culty, be consistent with the overall Bankruptcy Code structure.7 6 While
no explicit statutory authority supports these payments, a bankruptcy
court could authorize them if they enhanced the bankrupt's overall val-
ue, benefiting all creditors. If full payment to the cleaning service was
necessary to induce it to continue dealing with the firm in bankruptcy,
and if that continuity would enhance the value of the enterprise enough
that the other creditors would come out ahead, then the payment could
be justified as an appropriate expenditure of the debtor's assets under
Section 363.7' But, the Seventh Circuit asked, how often could those
conditions exist?78 Rational creditors understand sunk costs. If future
sales to the bankrupt are profitable, the economically rational supplier
will sell and ship, even if it lost money on pre-bankruptcy shipments.
And if the supplier will not sell and ship, often the bankrupt can find al-
ternative suppliers. So the instances in which a key supplier can stymie
the bankrupt cannot be many. The bankruptcy court's job, said the Sev-
enth Circuit, is to judge whether a proposed critical vendor payment
74 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004).
7 See id, at 868 ("Bankruptcy Judge Sonderby entered a critical-vendors order just as
Kmart proposed it, without notifying any disfavored creditors, without receiving any perti-
nent evidence (the record contains only some sketchy representations by counsel plus un-
helpful testimony by Kmart's CEO, who could not speak for the vendors), and without mak-
in any finding of fact that the disfavored creditors would gain or come out even.").
Id. at 871-72.
n See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006). More famous for authorizing whole-firm sales in
Chapter 11, § 363 also authorizes the debtor to use assets of the estate out of the ordinary
course, upon court order.
71 Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872-73.
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would enhance the remaining value of the estate enough to justify the
payment.
In practice, few lower courts expend much energy making the judg-
ments that the Seventh Circuit thought appropriate. Debtors ask that the
old vendors be paid and courts approve those requests.80 If the overall
balance supports the Seventh Circuit's approval prerequisite-that the
bankrupt and its other creditors be benefited by more than the extra
payment-the approval is justified priority jumping. Otherwise, it is un-
justified. Either way, the new critical vendor institution in bankruptcy-
an important one for modem bankruptcy practice-constitutes priority
jumping.
Although critical vendor payments were common when Kmart came
down, Judge Easterbrook's opinion reminds us that doctrinal priority
jumps may not be smoothly or easily countenanced. Opponents of pri-
ority jumps sometimes win. With that possibility, as well as circuit
splits, one can easily imagine prolonged contestation of doctrinal priori-
ty jumps, a circumstance that may make resort to Congress an attractive
strategy. Lobbied by trade creditors, Congress amended the Code in
2005 to give automatic administrative priority status to suppliers, wheth-
er or not "critical," who shipped any goods to the bankrupt within twen-
ty days of its bankruptcy."
79 Id. at 874 (stating that classification and unequal treatment would be "proper only when
the record shows that the classification would produce some benefit for the disfavored credi-
tors").
80 Joseph Gilday, "Critical" Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankrupt-
cy Code, 11 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 411, 419 (2003) ("Generally courts approving a critical
vendor motion leave it to the debtor to decide which of its aggressive vendors are important
enough to justify payment... . The definition of 'critical' differs from court to court, but it is
usually amorphous." (citations omitted)); McDermott, supra note 69, at 414-15 ("For years,
there has been little attention paid by courts to the precise standard that a debtor was required
to satisfy when seeking to honor pre-petition claims of essential creditors . . . . This approach
has led to a stance towards critical vendor payments that can be relatively lenient."); see also
Mich. Bureau of Workers' Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
80 B.R. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
81 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006). On trade creditors' lobbying, see Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, and the Need for Bankruptcy Reform: Hear-
ing on H.R. 975 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 45-47 (2003) (statement of Robin Schauseil, President, National
Association of Credit Management); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Law of Debtors and Creditors 467 (6th ed. 2009) (reporting that § 503(b)(9) resulted from
"much lobbying from an association representing trade creditors").
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3. The Section 363 Sale Priority Jump
The Bankruptcy Code anticipated that creditors would bargain to con-
sent to a bankruptcy plan that compromised statutory, conduct, and val-
uation uncertainties, and distributed value according to absolute priori-
ty.82 The Code contemplated that the debtor would sometimes sell
assets--deteriorating inventory, shuttered factories, or even an ongoing
operation that just did not fit the future of the bankrupt's downsized op-
erations. Section 363 authorizes the sale of the debtor's assets.
As the merger market boomed in the late 1980s and 1990s, the prac-
tice of whole-firm bankruptcy sales arose. A buyer for the entire firm
would be found and would make an offer. The court would then solicit
competing bids to validate the first offer and would sell the firm at the
completion of an auction. Having cashed out all its assets, the bankrupt
firm would distribute the sale proceeds to its creditors in priority order.8 4
a. Section 363 Sales and Market Valuation
In principle, the whole-firm sale raises no priority issues. But putting
a hard, market-determined figure on the firm's value preempts a valua-
tion fight in court. The bankrupt is sold, the auction yields, say, $50 mil-
lion, and that is what the court distributes to the bankrupt's creditors, no
more and no less. By contrast, the garden-variety reorganization without
a sale generates no hard valuation to guide the distribution. If the court
generously but mistakenly values the firm at $100 million, more credi-
tors are compensated in the reorganization than if the firm's value is ac-
curately pegged at only $50 million. Some creditors who would have
been wiped out in a hard sale value of $50 million could survive the re-
organization, receiving some distribution in the reorganization with a
court-determined value of $100 million. Suppose senior and junior
creditors are due $50 million each. With the court's mistakenly generous
82 See 11 U.S.C. H§ 1126(f), 1129(a)(8) (2006).
8 Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the
Bankruptcy Courts 168-70 (2005).
84 Id. LoPucki hypothesizes that the drafters of § 363 thought of the sales that they were
authorizing as transactions involving particular assets, not entire businesses. However, the
text of § 363 contains no limiting language to that effect.
8 5 Moving from a tendency to overvalue relative to market values to a tendency to under-
value relative to market values thereby affects distribution and, in effect, priority. Walter J.
Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 565, 570
(1950); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 547-48 (1983).
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$100 million valuation, juniors jump into the distributional queue to ob-
tain $50 million in nominal value-or one half of the true value of the
firm. While priority was absolute in form, in practice it was frustrated.
Figure 2: Replacing Judicial Valuation with Market Valuation
via a Section 363 Sale
1. Sale to thrd party
for $50M casb
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Market values Sealor Market values CTedtur paid
at $503 Creditor$ at $50M $50M sal
owed SSOM proceeds
(Iee value)
us Junr I JunIor
Creeners I Crediton
JAnson share owed SSOM unpaid
aue ela& I (ftce value)
w"A Seniors IL
om IOD
JudlialOver-Valuation Market Valuationvia
Compared with Market Values Section 363 Sale to Third Party
In this Figure 2, the left balance sheet shows the firm with $100 million of
debt, divided equally between seniors and juniors. The shaded rectangle on the
asset side shows the firm to be worth $50 million. The longer rectangle, which
includes the shaded rectangle on the asset side, shows a judicial over-valuation
of the firm, at $100 million. According to the conventional wisdom, over-
valuation of firms is common. The over-valuation allows all creditors to share
in the bankruptcy distribution, because in our example the court deems the firm
to be worth $100 million, allowing $100 million of creditors to be compensated
in the plan. If the compensation takes the form of stock of the reorganized
debtor, it will be divided equally between the seniors and juniors. Each will
have been deemed to be paid in full, but the actual value each receives would
be only $25 million, not the $50 million each is owed. Juniors would thereby be
over-compensated by $25 million in market value, while seniors would be un-
dercompensated by $25 million in market value.
In the balance sheet on the right, the firm's operations are sold under Section
363 for $50 million. That value is then distributed to pay the seniors in full,
while juniors receive nothing. If the market sale more accurately values the
firm's operations than the judicial valuation, then priority is better implemented
in the Section 363 sale. Regardless of which is more accurate, the emergence of
regular Section 363 sales has entailed a sharp reallocation of de facto priority
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and actual distribution to the extent that judicial valuation yielded assigned val-
ues materially larger than market valuations.
When judicial valuations were routine and Section 363-type sales ra-
re,86 this overvaluation priority jump for junior creditors was not un-
common. The judiciary was generally thought to over-value the debtor
firm, as compared to market values. The Section 363 sale thus alters pri-
ority by replacing elastic judicial valuation with hard-edged market val-
uation, jumping (perhaps legitimately) senior creditors and suppressing
juniors, as compared to the status quo ante. Even if market valuation is
no more accurate than judicial valuation, as long as it provides a system-
ically lower valuation, priority jumping is in play.
Section 363 has no overlay of priority embedded in it. Courts have,
however, held that the section cannot be used to undermine the Code's
basic priority rules,87 and the auction practice reduces the probability of
priority deviation due to valuation inaccuracies or insider rigging of the
sale. Even still, some commentators criticize the recent Chrysler reor-
ganization on this issue, with the transaction structure and the weak auc-
tion process depriving the court of information as to whether priority
was respected.
Once in place, the Section 363 sale can itself become an area for fur-
ther priority jumps, as analyzed next.
b. Section 363 Sales and Assumed Debt
The sale offers a way to reposition a firm's operations using a merger
model, rather than the bargained-for, internal restructuring model that
traditionally prevailed in Chapter 11. The merger model makes intuitive
86 Prior to the passage of the 1978 Code, judicial valuation in a large Chapter X reorgani-
zation was mandatory.
87 See, e.g., Institutional Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines v. Cont'l Airlines (In re Cont'l Air
Lines), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp.
(In re the Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Braniff Airways (In re Braniff Airways), 700 F.2d 935, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1983); Ohio Dept.
of Taxation v. Swallen's, Inc. (In re Swallen's, Inc.), 269 B.R. 634, 637-38 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2001); In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 114 B.R. 877, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In
re Lion Capital Grp., 49 B.R. 163, 177 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
88 See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich. L. Rev.
727, 767-71 (2010); see also Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization
after Chrysler and General Motors, 18 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 305, 315 (2010); Douglas G.
Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. Legal Analysis 271, 280-81
(2012).
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sense. Failed firms in declining industries should perhaps contract; other
firms may need a managerial shake-up. Merger offers one important
method of accomplishing these goals. However, to the extent that the
purchaser assumes some but not all of the debtor's pre-existing liabilities
as part consideration for the sale, creditors holding those claims typical-
ly enjoy a priority jump. The purchasing entity typically has an opera-
tional value exceeding the amount of the debt it assumes, while the con-
sideration flowing into the bankruptcy estate is insufficient to pay the
old creditors in full. The consequence is that the non-assumed creditors
are not paid in full, but the assumed creditors are. Figure 3 illustrates.
Figure 3: Section 363 Sale with Some Liabilities Assumed, Some
Left Behind
PrP-Sale Debtor with Post-Sale
Assets ad Liabillt"e Partittoned Purchasing Firm
for Sate Assets Liabilities
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Figure 3 illustrates a Section 363 sale with some of the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy liabilities assumed by the purchaser. The firm in Figure 3 lacks suf-
ficient value to pay its unsecured claims in full. Proportionately, they would be
paid seventy-five percent of the value of their claim, as represented in the left-
most balance sheet. In the middle balance sheet, the assets and claims are di-
vided for sale, with only some claims to be assumed by the purchaser and ex-
pected to be paid in full. In the right-most balance sheet, the full-payment of the
assumed claims is illustrated on the top balance sheet. The bottom balance
sheet shows that the Post-Sale Debtor has insufficient assets to pay the remain-
ing claims in full.
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An analysis similar to the Seventh Circuit's critical vendor analysis
could justify some sale-plus-debt-assumption transactions. 89 If the trans-
ferred creditor provides special value that enhances the new firm's oper-
ations, then as long as the enhanced value exceeds the size of the priority
jump, the left-behind creditors receive no less than their priority entitle-
ments. But if the enhanced value is insufficient, there is an unjustified
priority jump.
4. The SPV and Structured Finance Jump
Structured finance offers an important instance of transactional inno-
vation for priority jumping. It has become a major component of corpo-
rate finance. With structured finance, lenders wary of the debtor's over-
all operations and obligations can lend to an isolated facility-a special
purpose vehicle-that is structured to always be solvent.90 Think of a
borrower firm's operations as generating accounts receivable when the
firm ships product to customers. In doing its credit analysis and as-
sessing its repayment prospects, the prospective lender may wish to
avoid the firm's operational risks. Instead, it may wish to lend simply on
the strength of the firm's accounts receivable-a common arrangement.
But even a conventional loan on the accounts receivable carries non-
payment risk that the lender would like to avoid, and that the borrower
firm would like to avoid having to compensate the lender for running. If
the debtor goes bankrupt, the Bankruptcy Code automatically enjoins the
lender from collecting on its loan (called, in bankruptcy vocabulary, "the
automatic stay").9' If the lender thinks that its collateral is deteriorating
in value, it can ask the court for relief, and the court is required to either
adequately protect the lender or lift the stay.92 Even though courts are
usually solicitous of the secured creditor's request, the creditor may
wish to avoid both the risk of judicial error and the inconvenience of
having to go to court. It would like to seize and sell the security immedi-
ately. If it cannot do so, not only does it risk an uncompensated decline
89 See Kmart, 359 F.3d at 868.
90 See generally John A. Pearce II & Ilya A. Lipin, Special Purpose Vehicles in Bankrupt-
cy Litigation, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 177, 182-85 (2011).
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
92 See id. § 362(d).
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in the value of its collateral, but it does not necessarily get interest paid
during the delay in obtaining value. 3
The secured creditor would also like to avoid having its priority
jumped by a new-money lender in the firm's bankruptcy.94 If the debtor
cannot repay the new, highly-prioritized DIP loan, there are multiple
scenarios in which the pre-bankruptcy lender with a security interest in
the accounts receivable could lose value.
Figure 4: Before and After SPV Transaction
Canvensiom lon (solid tmstws) 1 ' 1'
Originator owes to the Bank and the other Bank
creditors. Bank is secured by originator' a
accoutWs receivable. Bank is subject to
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conveyance la, and interest payment (2) Loan
uncertainties, if the Originator files for (1) AIR N, (4) Obligation
bankruptcy '1 1 to repay
SPV Tranction (dashed arrows) -. V
(1) Originator tasters Accounts Receivable ("AIR') to SPV SPV
(2) Bank lands to SPV; Bank is no longer a Ibrmual creditor of orignlate but
Is a creditor of the SPVlaIeadA Bank
(3) SPV distributes loan proceeds to Originator as consideration forA/R
(4) If Originator files for bankmiptcy, Bank looksto SPV to be paid. Since SPV is
not bankrupt. stay does not apply. No preference, fraudulent conveyance or
interest payment uncertainte. Bank collects on the A/R prior to the
Originator s otber creditors.
Figure 4 illustrates a common special purpose vehicle setup. Without an SPV,
the firm's creditors share proportionately in all of the assets of the Originator. If
creditors cannot obtain sufficient value from the cash and factory to be repaid
in full, they can claim against the accounts receivable. If the creditor is secured
(by the factory or by the accounts receivable), it cannot assuredly liquidate the
collateral immediately upon the bankruptcy filing, due to the Bankruptcy
Code's automatic stay. And while the secured creditor must be adequately pro-
tected, that adequate protection (a) is not a guarantee of payment, but a judicial
"best-efforts" obligation and (b) often does not require interest to be paid for
the delay in repayment, due the interaction between Section 502(b) and Section
506, as interpreted in United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers ofInwood
Forest Associates. However, by financing the SPV, one creditor-here, the
Bank-can exclude the others from claiming on the accounts receivable and,
9 See id. §§ 502, 506; United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
94 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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because it can liquidate the SPV immediately upon the bankruptcy filing of the
Originator, the Bank can escape the likely cost of a bankruptcy in which it
would often not receive the time value of money for the delay. Arrow (1) illus-
trates the sale of the accounts receivable to the SPV for the cash illustrated in
arrow (3). Because the Bank's relationship moves from one with the Originator
(via the top solid arrow) to a relation with the SPV, via dashed arrows (2) and
(4), the Bank no longer is tied up in the Originator's bankruptcy.
Structured finance enables the pre-bankruptcy lender and debtor to
contract out of these potential future repayment annoyances and entan-
glements. The parties set up an SPV, a separate corporation that serves
as the lender's formal borrower. The SPV continually buys the accounts
receivable from the debtor using advances from the priority-seeking
lender. With this structure, the lender divorces its credit risk from the
risks of the debtor's operations, since its borrower is not the debtor but
the SPV, which has no operations, but only owns the debtor's accounts
receivable. If the operating debtor were ever to file for bankruptcy, the
SPV would not also go bankrupt, so the lender to the SPV would not be
subject to the automatic stay. This SPV lender could immediately seize
its receivables collateral pursuant to its contract, sell the collateral, and
lend the proceeds to another company. The lender would also not need
to worry about being trumped by new DIP loans or roll-ups, since again,
its borrower, the SPV, would not be in bankruptcy. For its part, the
debtor uses the SPV to fund its operations by continually cashing out its
receivables, at prices reflecting the lowered risk to the lender. These
SPV-type transactions have mushroomed in recent decades.
C. Lobbying for Priority: Rent-Seeking in Congress in the Lead-Up to
the Financial Crisis
Thus far we have examined transactional and litigation-based priority
jumps. But for serious rent-seeking, the place to go is Congress. Bank-
ruptcy rent-seeking in Congress was in play recently, interacting with
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, in which two financial instruments-
repos and derivatives-played central roles.95 Priority jumping is central
to repos and derivatives.
Markets for the two instruments grew massively in the preceding two
decades, 96 and expert analysts tell us that without congressionally-
95 See Roe, supra note 12, at 549-55.96 Repo market information can be found in Fed. Reserve Bd., Statistical Supplement to
the Federal Reserve Bulletin (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
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granted priority jumps, these markets would not have been viable.
While neither instrument fundamentally caused the crisis-disruptions
in the mortgage market were more basic-each priority structure argua-
bly exacerbated financial problems during the crisis, worsening the fi-
nancial failures at AIG, Bear Steams, and Lehman Brothers.98 With a
bankruptcy commission currently planning to redraft the Bankruptcy
Code for Congress,99 one should expect additional important legislative
bankruptcy rent-seeking in the near future.
1. The Repo Recharacterization Jump
Repos are agreements between a lender and borrower to sell and
quickly thereafter repurchase collateral. The borrower owns an asset, but
needs cash. The lender has cash but wants complete security for the low-
interest loan it is willing to make. So the borrower "sells" the asset to the
lender, agreeing to repurchase (repo, for short) the asset at a fixed time,
often the next day. The repurchase price is slightly higher than the sale
price, with the difference serving as the interest payment. The transac-
tion accomplishes what a secured loan does: the asset sold and repur-
chased is the security and the pricing differential is the interest pay-
ment. 00 The lenders and borrowers want the transaction treated as a sale
rather than a loan, so that the lender can jump priority and escape from
several Bankruptcy Code frictions. If courts viewed the repo as a sale,
the buyer-lender benefits in ways that even the secured creditor in bank-
supplement/default.htm [hereinafter Statistical Supplement], and U.S. Government Securi-
ties Dealers-Positions and Financing, Fed. Reserve Archival Sys. for Econ. Res.,
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frb/page/31488 (last visited) [hereinafter Securities
Dealers]. Derivatives market information can be found in ISDA Market Survey, Int'l Swaps
& Derivatives Ass'n (2010), available at http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/isda-market-
survey-annual-data.pdf [hereinafter ISDA Market Survey].
9 See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 277-79.
98 See Roe, supra note 12, at 555-69; see also William D. Cohan, House of Cards: A Tale
of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street 138 (2009); Henry M. Paulson, Jr., On the
Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System 94-100 (2010);
Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 Harv. L. Rev.
1151, 1201 (2010).
99 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1oo Jeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards, 76 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 565, 572 (2002).
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ruptcy does not. The buyer-lender owns the asset and the bankrupt can-
not reclaim it.' 0
An ordinary secured creditor is barred from selling its security imme-
diately after the debtor files for bankruptcy.102 Such a secured creditor is
entitled to be adequately protected,0 3 but if the protection proves to be
inadequate, the creditor's remedies are incomplete.10 4 The secured credi-
tor also risks having its priority jumped by newly prioritized DIP lend-
ers, a scenario we have already examined.' 5 Even if the secured creditor
wins out eventually over the DIP lender, it must monitor the situation to
better assure its eventual victory. Moreover, while waiting for the collat-
eral, the secured creditor wants to be paid interest. Sometimes it is paid,
sometimes not. 06 When paid, the secured creditor is not always happy
with the interest rate the court awards.' 07
The repo market got off to a shaky start in the 1980s. Although the
lender and borrower called their transaction a sale with an obligation to
repurchase, early courts did not.'08 They saw the transaction for what it
was, a basic secured financing transaction, which would subject the
lender to the Bankruptcy Code's restrictions on secured lenders and the
state-based Article 9 requirements.109 Lenders in the repo market were
aghast, claiming that the repo market was vital to the economy and
could not survive if their transactions were not viewed as sales. They
went to Congress for relief. Congress gave it to them initially and then
broadened their insulation from bankruptcy during the next two decades.
Most importantly, the repo (and derivatives) industry sought, and
Congress granted, exemption from the Code's automatic stay, which
would have otherwise prevented repo buyer-lenders from seizing their
101 See Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 23 B.R. 165,
165-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (questioning whether a repo was really better characterized
as a secured loan and not as a sale).
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). If the creditor already possesses the security, it could be
required to return it to the bankrupt, if the bankrupt needs it to operate better. See id.
§ 542(a).
103 See id. §§ 362(d)(1), 363(e).
104 See id. § 507(b).
05 See supra Subsection II.B.1.
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
107 See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 471 (2004).
108 See Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 23 B.R. 165,
166 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
109 See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (maintaining that transactions in the nature of security are
secured transactions, "regardless of... form").
Breaking Bankruptcy Priority
collateral and collecting on their loans once a bankruptcy proceeding
had begun. And they sought and obtained from Congress safe harbors
from the application of fraudulent conveyance law and preference law,
which reclaims eve-of-bankruptcy repayments to individual creditors for
all creditors to share. 0
This effective recharacterization of the repo lender as property owner
instead of lender immunizes it from the incivilities that mainstream se-
cured creditors suffer. Exemption from the automatic stay also insulates
the repo buyer-lender from potential no-interest rules and from the risks
of being jumped over by new DIP lending."' The repo creditor does not
have to worry about obtaining possession or being ousted of possession
if it already has possession, because it owns the asset. Nor does it need
to worry about the potential inadequacy of judicially granted adequate
protection of the creditor's secured interest while it awaits the asset's re-
turn. The repo lender need not worry about a court-determined interest
rate while waiting to be repaid, because it can sell its own asset and re-
invest at market rates. The differences in protection and risk between a
sale and secured credit status may be small in the abstract, but in the
multi-trillion-dollar repo business," 2 a small reduction in risk can shave
a few basis points off of loans that are made in quantity repeatedly.
This recharacterization of the repo buyer/lender as a property buyer
and not as a secured lender exemplifies basic priority jumping. When
courts did not sanction the jump for an influential sector of the finance
industry, the industry looked to Congress.
2. The Derivatives Market's Priority Jump
Derivatives are side bets on fundamental financial events. The arche-
typical derivative is for foreign exchange: A company exposed to the
ups and downs of the euro-dollar exchange rate transfers this risk to an-
other firm by agreeing that it will pay up if the euro moves in one direc-
tion but will receive payments if the euro goes in the other direction. To
110 On repo players' authority to liquidate collateral in their possession, see 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362(b)(17), 362(b)(27), 560 (2006); on exemptions from preference rules, see id.
§ 546(g), (j); on setoff breadth, see id. §§ 553(a), 560; on exemption from constructive
fraudulent conveyance liability, see id. § 546(g), 6); and on ability to terminate repos, swaps,
and master netting agreements, see id. §§ 555, 559-61.
. See id. § 541.
112 See Statistical Supplement, supra note 96; Securities Dealers, supra note 96 (repo mar-
ket); ISDA Market Survey, supra note 96 (derivatives market).
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assure payment, the parties can give one another security for their obli-
gations. If one of them fails, the other would normally enjoy the status
of a secured creditor, which is treated well in bankruptcy but as earlier
noted, faces frictions. Derivatives players would like to avoid these fric-
tions and jump priority over other creditors. In bankruptcy conceptual-
ization, there is no reason to allow this."' Hence, the derivatives players
wanted congressional relief, which they obtained in the decades leading
up to the financial crisis. 1 14
Before this congressional relief arrived, derivatives counterparties
faced bankruptcy risks similar to the repo players. If a party to a deriva-
tives contract failed and filed for bankruptcy, the counterparty typically
wanted to terminate the contract immediately and seize and sell the un-
derlying security if the counterparty was in the money. It did not want to
wait for the contract to be resolved (often without interest being paid).
But bankruptcy law imposed all of these difficulties on the counterparty
and more. Basic bankruptcy law allows the bankrupt to "play the mar-
ket": It may hold open contracts in abeyance and decide as the bankrupt-
cy proceeds whether to affirm or reject each contract."' Under normal
bankruptcy doctrine, the bankrupt could wait a significant period before
deciding.'1 6 If the market had moved in its favor, it would affirm the
contract. If the market had moved against it, it would reject the contract.
All those who deal with potential bankrupts face such risks, but open-
ended, volatile financial contracts such as derivatives contracts created
greater risks for the bankrupt's counterparties than the norm."'
Armed with arguments and lobbying muscle, the derivatives industry
went to Congress repeatedly over the last few decades to obtain excep-
tions from ordinary bankruptcy practice. In 1982, Congress excepted
certain derivatives contracts and counterparties from the automatic stay,
enabling counterparties to close out these contracts as soon as the debtor
113 See Roe, supra note 12, at 581.
114 Id. at 576 ("[Financial] players lobbied hard to get derivatives priorities extended in
1982, 1984, 1994, 2005, and 2006, and to keep them in 2010.").
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).
116 See id. § 365(d)(2) ("In a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the trustee
may assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or
of personal property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan . . . ").
R Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 Am. Bankr. L.J.
123, 135 (2010) (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code is ill-equipped to handle "the possibility
of a claim that might change in value on a daily or hourly basis").
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went bankrupt."' In 1990, Congress extended the Code's protection of
derivatives contracts, excepting them from preference rules and limiting
debtors' ability to accept or reject the contracts under Section 365.19
These rules have since been expanded to further improve derivatives
participants' status in the bankruptcy process. 120
As Congress progressively improved the bankruptcy treatment of de-
rivatives counterparties in recent decades, the derivatives market bal-
looned, extending beyond the archetypical foreign exchange derivative
described above to include credit default swaps (that is, obligations de-
rived from a firm's debt), which function as guarantees (and were cen-
tral in the AIG failure), as well as exotica like derivatives based on
weather or price movements of a single natural resource. 12 1 In failures
such as AIG, the derivatives counterparties with good collateral trans-
ferred risk and illiquidity onto the debtor's other creditors.12 2 This was
priority jumping.
Overall, these priority jumps-from critical vendor to structured fi-
nance via SPVs to roll-uaps to repos and derivatives-are substantial.
The underlying transaction types either arose for the first time or grew
massively in recent decades. A researcher would be hard pressed to find
many major bankruptcies of the past decade or so where one or another
or several of these priority jumps did not play a central role. Modem
priority jumping is thus at the core of the action in Chapter 11, at least as
much as is the resolution of pre-set "absolute" priorities. Perhaps a
Chapter 11 process that had the predictable creditors' bargain as its cen-
tral feature would be superior to what we have-and we have much
sympathy with that view-but it is just not how on-the-ground Chapter
11 has worked for several decades.
118 See Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222, § 3(c), 96 Stat. 235, 236 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (1982)); see also Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 392, 98 Stat. 333, 365 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (1984)); Act of June 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, § 102(3), 104
Stat. 267, 267 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17) (1990)).
119 See Act of June 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, §§ 103, 106, 104 Stat. 267, 268 (codi-
fied at 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(g), 560 (1990)).
120 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 501(d)(7)(B)(vii), 108
Stat. 4106, 4144 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1994)); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, § 907(a)(1)(E), 119 Stat.
23, 172-73 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2005)).
121 See generally Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to
Ap roach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 705 (2008).
E Roe, supra note 12, 550-51.
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The Appendix details other recent priority jumps: gift plans, exemp-
tions from fraudulent conveyance liability, and erosion of securities law
subordinations via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. And historically there have
been yet more jumps, including the equity receivership, the Chapter X
valuation process, and the marshaling doctrine, each of which we also
briefly examine in the Appendix. Together these examples further evi-
dence the regularity of priority jumping and its place as a routine feature
of corporate reorganization.
III. IMPLICATIONS
What are the policy and theoretical ramifications of considering prior-
ity as a process? The first issue is how we conceive of bankruptcy: bank-
ruptcy's priority structure is never "done." It should not be viewed as a
static creditors' bargain, where creditors find their place in a fixed archi-
tecture of priorities and then charge for their expected risk. In an im-
portant, now-classic analysis, Thomas Jackson showed how bankruptcy
should be analyzed normatively for its conformity to a contractarian
creditors' bargain: What structure would creditors collectively desire to
process their claims? And, the argument ran, key elements of bankruptcy
law should be seen as conforming to the creditors' bargain model. Devi-
ations should then be suppressed.123 While we share several of the nor-
mative perspectives embedded in the creditors' bargain view, our point
here is that the bankruptcy priority structure is regularly mutating, with
rent-seeking driving much of the mutation. The framework is never fin-
ished; it is always contested.
From this condition of persistent mutation emerges the second major
conceptual issue-efficiency. True, there is good reason to think that
some priority adjustments follow and facilitate financial innovation,
thereby improving the bankruptcy process and lending practices outside
of bankruptcy.12 4 Overall, the Section 363 sale, in our view, plays that
role. But there is also reason to think that bankruptcy rent-seeking gen-
123 See Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 16, at 24-27; Jackson, Creditor's Bargain,
supra note 16, at 860, 907.
124 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's
Ghost, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 393, 412-425 (demonstrating that priority rules in bankruptcy
have been modified over the years to reflect economic and financial market trends); Omer
Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 Bankr. Dev. J. 287, 387 (2003) ("[Bankruptcy]
law follows the market ... ).
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erates more than the optimal level of adjustment and that it draws re-
sources away from activities more socially useful than a priority arms
race.
Some inefficiencies are local and transactional: financial markets may
be damaged or firms made less effective, but with no systemic implica-
tions. Other times, inefficiencies can be deep and wide if major markets
experience priority jumps and the process of reacting to the change is
widespread but sticky. If markets and creditors react slowly and adjust-
ment takes years, then rent-seeking could induce substantial inefficien-
cies. There is reason to think that the priority jumps in the derivatives
and repo markets in recent decades caused systemic debilities, thereby
contributing to the severity of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.125
This Part explores these important consequences of priority jumping.
A. Dynamic Creditor Bargains
We can understand why rent-seeking has not been integral to the
scholarly conceptualization of bankruptcy. According to convention,
bankruptcy priorities are conceptually clear-priority is "absolute"-and
priority is typically implemented in courts, not by administrative agen-
cies responsible to Congress. Courts are the least likely venue for suc-
cessful rent-seeking in the American legal system, and most restructur-
ing deals in isolation do not immediately implicate major rent-seeking.
If instead, bankruptcy priority is mutating regularly, then the process
is more dynamic. Here is how we would recharacterize the bankruptcy
process. Creditors begin by bargaining inside a priority framework. Ex-
isting rules reflect and implement that bargain, for the most part. But
creditors can contest the rules and obtain favorable rule changes. If
change were infrequent, we could simply think of the creditors' bargain
as being reset. It would then proceed under the new rules. Years later, it
might be reset again. But in fact, creditors regularly contest the rules
through innovative transactions, litigation, and legislation, such that the
creditors' bargain is always in flux. Every priority jump induces at-
tempts by creditors to retrade their existing bargains and to replan their
prospective ones. In our view, highlighting this dynamic contestation of
rules is necessary to describe the reality of bankruptcy.
Moreover, this reconceptualization implicates related, standard bank-
ruptcy concepts. Though we traditionally think of bankruptcy as merely
125 Roe, supra note 12, at 549-54.
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a process of ordering state-based claims, 126 priority jumping analysis
tells us that it is more than that. State-law-oriented conceptualizations
are incomplete. Under state law, trade creditors, who enjoy equal priori-
ty in payment, would be paid based on who wins the race to the court-
house. The traditional creditors' bargain in bankruptcy collectivizes their
collection efforts while recognizing their equal priority status under state
law. Under that approach, they all would wait to receive equal treatment.
But under modem bankruptcy, a critical vendor doctrine jumps some to
the head of the vendor payment line, not by reintroducing a race to the
courthouse but by introducing a doctrine that jumps priority for those
whom the bankruptcy process deems critical.
Similarly, the repo and derivatives rules can be contrasted with both
state law and the Bankruptcy Code's creditors' bargain. Under state law,
creditors can liquidate their security and apply it to their loan; for the
most part secured creditors cannot do so in bankruptcy, as the automatic
stay prevents the liquidation. But for derivatives and repo creditors, the
Code makes an exception, allowing them their state remedies. In place
of a race to the courthouse, the Code establishes a race for repo or deriv-
atives status, which accords the winners immediate access to special
remedies that the Code denies other creditors.
B. Is Priority Jumping Efficient?
We make the positive, conceptual case that bankruptcy is not the stat-
ic, contractarian institution that has come to dominate much of bank-
ruptcy thinking. It is rife with rent-seeking, the costs of which tax the ef-
ficiency of the bankruptcy process. With the rent-seeking, priority-
breaking concepts we propose in mind, bankruptcy scholars can better
analyze bankruptcy's efficiencies and inefficiencies going forward. We
outline the core efficiency considerations in this Section.
The efficiency properties of priority jumping are intimately related to
its political economy. We can evaluate the efficiency of priority jumping
with the standard framework used to analyze the efficiency effects of le-
gal change, with both ex post and ex ante costs and benefits relevant.
126 Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 816-22 (1987); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment
on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 109-11
(1984).
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The major ex post costs and benefits of any given priority jump depend
on whether and how jumped creditors adjust to a new priority rule, and
whether post-jump adjustments enhance or diminish firm value. The ma-
jor ex ante costs are rent-seeking costs-the influence costs discussed
above,12 7 as well as the costs of uncertainty. Contestable priority rules
make creditors' returns more variable and harder to predict. The greater
variance of their returns may cause creditors to raise their prices or forgo
what would otherwise be value-increasing transactions.
It is difficult to generalize about ex post effects of a priority jump on
firm value. However, the rent-seeking costs of priority jumping-
influence costs and uncertainty costs-strongly suggest that priority
jumping may overall be inefficient, with only few jumps providing un-
ambiguous efficiency improvements.
1. Ex Post Costs: Adjusting to Priority Jumps
Once a creditor jumps priority, if the jump occurs against competing
creditors' expectations, then the winners receive an immediate windfall
in the transaction at hand unless the losers are able to adjust the terms of
their credit immediately and at a low cost. More generally, if the jump is
likely to repeat in future transactions, the losers would need to adjust all
of their other existing and potential transactions, either by raising the
price of their credit or reducing the amount of their lending in the affect-
ed markets.128
According to Modigliani and Miller's famous irrelevance proposi-
tions, priority jumps would not have lasting inefficiencies in a friction-
less world.12 9 In a frictionless world, a firm cannot increase its value by
taking on an optimal level of risky debt, because the risk assumed by
taking on risky debt is simply drained away from the firm's other inves-
tors. Those other investors, upon learning that they are advantaged by
the other debt that is sopping up more risk, should be willing to lower
their demanded return because their advantaged debt would have been
127 See supra Section II.A.
128 Or they could counterattack in the legal system, a subject discussed earlier. See supra
Subsection II.B. 1.
129 Under assumptions of market regularities-perfect information, no tax distortions, and
no bankruptcy or recapitalization costs-Modigliani and Miller demonstrated, in one of fi-
nance's most compelling theorems, that financial structure does not matter to firm value.
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 296 (1958).
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made less risky. In smoothly functioning markets, the adjustment is im-
mediate and what the firm gains when dealing with one investor, it must
lose to another investor.
Creditors and firms of course do care deeply about priority, and a
good deal of theoretical financial analysis focuses on identifying where
the exceptions to the Modigliani-Miller Hypothesis arise.3 With priori-
ty jumping, the more quickly the losers can adjust at low cost, the closer
it is to being a wash in terms of overall firm value. More risk and return
for one creditor, then, simply means less risk and return for another. 13
Firm value would change little. But if the losers cannot react well and
quickly in the market, then there will be a continuing transfer from los-
ers to winners beyond the transaction at hand. At the least, the losers
may have other similar existing but now disfavored investments that do
not mature for a time and cannot be adjusted quickly and at low cost. Or
they may suffer institutional constraints that preclude them from react-
ing immediately.
If jumped creditors cannot adjust, the jump could be ex post ineffi-
cient. Focusing on only the value of the various creditors' post-jump
claims on the firm, the loss to losers would outweigh the gains to win-
ners in a given transaction. Moreover, losers' inability to adjust would
encourage winners to excessively use the newly favored financing in or-
der to transfer value to themselves from the losing creditors, even if
overall firm value were reduced. One could imagine, for example, a firm
incurring more short-term, overnight repo financing than is ideal after it
becomes clear that this financing form will receive more favorable
treatment in bankruptcy than other loans.'32 Because creditors will price
overnight repo financing attractively, reflecting its favored status in
bankruptcy, the debtor firm will naturally be drawn to this financing
form, even if its overuse might diminish firm value overall. And there
are large classes of creditors who without a doubt cannot adjust.'33 Simi-
130 Richard Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 440-501 (10th ed. 2011).
131 Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se-
cured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857, 864 (1996) (noting categories of creditors
who may be unable to adjust to changes in priority rankings).
132 Certainly the volume of repo financing skyrocketed after major events clarifying the
favorable bankruptcy treatment for that financing. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at
278.
1' Tort creditors and the government as a tax or regulatory creditor typically cannot adjust
future transactions to account for the latest priority jump, let alone adjust existing transac-
tions. Small claimants typically do not and cannot adjust existing transactions. See Bebchuk
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larly, SPVs could be priced attractively to the debtor, be costly to some
of the debtor's other creditors, and then be overused.
Besides its subordinating effect, a priority jump may transfer risk in
other ways. Consider the likelihood that some creditors and equity hold-
ers rely on the signal emanating from bank lending and monitoring. 134
Banks then obtain a jump in priority through, say, easier roll-up of weak
pre-bankruptcy loan positions into super-prioritized DIP loans. The
banks' newfound opportunity-to-jump induces them to slack off on their
monitoring, and their signals of debtor quality become less valuable.
Even if other parties who had relied on bank signals are aware of the
change, their institutional structures and lending and investing practices
may depend on the continuing high quality of these signals. Other par-
ties incur adjustment costs following the banks' priority jump. Priority
jumping thus has ripple effects in addition to subordinating losing credi-
tors.
These observations are not to say that all jump-induced changes in fi-
nancing arrangements reduce firm value. Changes in priority rules and
other financial regulation sometimes facilitate new, more efficient
modes of financing. Without information about the adjustments to firms'
financing and investments induced by priority jumping, it is difficult to
generalize about whether priority jumps are transactionally efficient.
2. Ex Ante Influence Costs and the Costs of Uncertainty
The availability of priority jumps naturally attracts resources in their
pursuit. Influence and uncertainty costs rise. These rent-seeking costs are
& Fried, supra note 131, at 882-91. Subordination agreements or some type of covenant pro-
tection could enable voluntary creditors to adjust existing transactions to account for priority
jumps. Small claimants, however, are unlikely to enjoy the negotiating leverage or the advice
of counsel to obtain these ex ante protections from their borrowers. If they fail to adjust their
future transactions, either by pricing the increased risk or reducing their lending in risky
markets, they go out of business,
134 See James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothe-
sis, 31 J. Fin. Econ. 25, 25-26 (1992); Sudip Datta et al., Bank Monitoring and the Pricing of
Corporate Public Debt, 51 J. Fin. Econ. 435, 448-49 (1999); Joanna M. Shepherd et al.,
What Else Matters for Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L.
Rev. 991, 992-1006 (2008); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1073, 1078 (1995); Frederick Tung,
Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 115, 125-29 (2009); Steven Ongena et al., Banks and Bonds:
The Impact of Bank Loan Announcements on Bond and Equity Prices 3 (Nov. 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/files/center/ongena/preprints/orw.pdf.
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in play across the board, sometimes outweighed by transactional effi-
ciency, sometimes not. In general, the most sophisticated, best-organized,
and best-financed creditor groups are best positioned to pursue and ob-
tain priority jumps than other types of creditors. These creditor types are
also likely to be the creditors best able to adjust to new priority jumps
that might otherwise disfavor them. Priority jumping in this dimension
can therefore simply be an arms race among sophisticated creditors, a
race that serves to achieve only short-term advantages, which get com-
peted away. Over the long haul in this scenario, none of the sophisticated
creditors are better off.
The competitive priority jumping among unsecured financial credi-
tors, DIP lenders, and SPV lenders discussed earlier may exemplify this
dynamic: Each type of creditor can invest resources in pursuit of a prior-
ity jump or adjust over time to being jumped, either through its pricing
of risk, transactional innovation, litigation, or lobbying. The same may
be said about repo priority, which resulted in expanded reliance on repo
financing that substituted for commercial paper financing."' The same
money market investors often lend in both forms.3 6 And less sophisti-
cated unsecured creditors with difficulty adjusting will be subordinated
in any event in these markets, so they may be no better or worse off. Ex
post efficiency effects are unlikely to be positive in this scenario; rent-
seeking and reactive adjustment costs are likely to dominate, suggesting
that priority jumping here is on the whole inefficient.
Moreover, a contested priority jump is typically not resolved cleanly
or quickly. It is often contested in multiple forums before clarity devel-
ops on the legal status of the attempted priority jump. For example, re-
call the DIP lenders' pursuit of cross-collateralization and roll-up priori-
ty, discussed earlier, which involved multiple litigated cases across
multiple judicial circuits.3 7
Features peculiar to bankruptcy litigation may exacerbate rent-
seeking costs in these scenarios. Because of the dearth of bankruptcy
appeals,'38 bankruptcy judges enjoy autonomy in administering their
135 See Roe, supra note 12, at 557-58.
136 Id. at 557. The more difficult issue for repo priority is when the risk transferred ends up
being picked up by the U.S. Treasury, as it effectively is when it moves to the bank deposit
base or when it otherwise involves serious systemic risks. But that is not the topic of this Ar-
ticle.
13 See supra Subsection II.B.1.
138 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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cases. Some courts may compete to attract large cases to their courts. 139
To that end, they may offer decisions attractive to "case placers" 40-- the
lawyers and their clients who influence where large reorganizations get
filed. The pattern of large case filings shows that only a handful of the
hundreds of bankruptcy courts in the United States are serious competi-
tors. But the courts that do compete may sometimes allow practices that
are not clearly authorized in the Bankruptcy Code-roll-ups or extensive
critical vendor payments, for example. 4 1
One can imagine that as part of the pre-bankruptcy negotiation be-
tween a debtor and its dominant bank lender, if DIP lending were con-
templated, the lender might insist that the bankruptcy filing be made in a
jurisdiction sympathetic to roll-up priority. As long as the debtor and
lender are amenable to the roll-up, why chance the possibility that their
agreed-to financing arrangement might be disapproved by the judge?
Hence, there could be even more priority jumping than reported cases
would indicate: a jurisdiction amenable to roll-ups may attract more fil-
ings involving roll-ups and more settlements based on roll-ups because
of the key players' desire that the old debt be rolled into the DIP loan.
The autonomy of bankruptcy judges and the enthusiasm of some
courts to compete for large cases may attract investment in competitive
rent-seeking. These bankruptcy litigation dynamics may impede the
prompt resolution of legal uncertainty, a circumstance perversely well
suited to attracting costly investments in priority jumping. To the extent
that creditor groups believe that priority jumps may be attainable
through transactional innovation and litigation, they may be tempted to
invest resources pursuing favorable legal changes. And the lawyers that
pioneer an ultimately successful priority jumping technology will attract
business from debtors and creditors that wish to make use of the tech-
nology. So lawyers have repeat-play incentives to experiment with the
139 Landing a case typically brings a wealth of fees to local bankruptcy professionals-not
only lawyers, but accountants, bankers, consultants, and the like. Because bankruptcy judges
are typically chosen from the local bankruptcy bar, they can be loyal to their former col-
leagues in private practice. Presiding over a large case may also be exciting for a bankruptcy
judge. Federal appellate and district court judges are typically not similarly attached to local
bankruptcy practice, so bankruptcy courts are the primary locus of this competition for cases.
1 LoPucki, supra note 83, at 137-40.
141 Kmart illustrates one potential effect of federal appellate court intervention into this
case competition among bankruptcy courts. Following Kmart, large Chapter 11 cases report-
edly stopped coming to Chicago. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy from Olympus, 77 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 959, 959-61 (2010). Major decisions thwarting debtors' druthers may cause
debtor lawyers to shop for more friendly venues.
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technology and advertise their expertise,14 2 which may attract still more
resources to the pursuit of and defense against priority jumps.
This process may also generate non-uniformity of priority rules across
jurisdictions, with the legal status of attempted priority jumps varying
across courts, districts, and circuits for years. As priority-jumping activi-
ties increase, uncertainty and its attendant costs rise, especially for those
creditors who cannot seamlessly adjust to new priority rules and the
higher risk they bear. Continually changing priority rules should dampen
otherwise worthwhile financing transactions because creditors are una-
ble to clearly anticipate or respond to unexpected risk transfers.
Even if the potential financier believes it is as likely to obtain a priori-
ty jump as it is to be on the losing end, the increase in variance, if not
fully diversifiable, deters some financing. The transaction costs of de-
fense (or offense) could also lead creditors to prefer transactions with
firms with lower chances of being affected by priority jumping, even if
those firms might otherwise be less creditworthy. Moreover, some clas-
ses of creditors are less likely to obtain priority jumps. They will need to
charge more as a risk premium, and/or will avoid some financing trans-
actions.
We do not attempt a hard and fast conclusion that priority jumping is
inherently bad (or good), and we doubt that such an assured conclusion
is obtainable. But we do show that jumping involves a mix of rent-
seeking, improved rules, and re-contracting among the bankruptcy play-
ers. The last two features are not new to business bankruptcy thinking;
the first is, however. Before we can come to grips with the costs and
benefits of rent-seeking or query how we might guide rent-seeking into
its most productive channels, we must update the conventional creditors'
bargain view by incorporating the priority jumping phenomenon into our
bankruptcy thinking.
From a political economy perspective, bankruptcy is no different from
banking regulation, securities law, or other areas of financial regulation,
where the continuing interaction among regulators, courts, and the regu-
lated has long been the subject of academic and policy study. Priority
jumping has the same pathologies that plague these other areas of finan-
cial regulation. The creditors' bargain construct reveals one dimension
142 At a certain point, of course, if and when the law becomes settled, the technology be-
comes easily replicated.
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of the bankruptcy process; our rent-seeking, priority-jumping perspec-
tive reveals a second, equally important dimension.
CONCLUSION
We have reconceptualized bankruptcy as a process in which creditors
repeatedly break priority so as to favor themselves. They invent new
transactions, pursue new court doctrines, and lobby legislatures for new
rules that yield them higher priority. They defend against priority jump-
ing by structuring stronger transactional positions, by opposing newly
offered doctrines in court or by offering alternatives, and by seeking leg-
islative reversal of judicially created priorities.
Bankruptcy thus needs to be reframed as a dynamic rent-seeking pro-
cess as much as one of creditors hypothetically bargaining within a static
framework of absolute priority, because the priority framework is fluid
and contested. The creditors' bargain may be normatively superior to
rent-seeking, but it is an incomplete description that overlooks the rent-
seeking process we have described. Sometimes the resulting transaction-
al, doctrinal, and legislative structures are more efficient and fair than
what they replace. But with priority so often up for grabs, considerable
investment in the distributional rules cannot be perfectly efficient, and
will be afflicted with pathologies.
Faced with priorities they dislike, financiers and their lawyers inno-
vate with new transactions. That is often the cheapest way to break pri-
ority, as compared with lobbying a reluctant Congress. If challenged,
they defend their newly acquired priority in litigation. If they lose, or if
they need confirmation, they consider whether to seek legislation to
overturn courts and old rules. This is core to the process of bankruptcy-
in-action.
APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PRIORITY
JuMPs
This Appendix recounts three additional recent priority jumps, as well
as three historical priority jumps under reorganization regimes that pre-
ceded the current Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
One might think that priority jumping is a modern phenomenon, in-
duced by the accelerating financial complexity of American business.
But this is not so. Priority jumping characterized corporate reorganiza-
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tion in the past, going back to its origins in the nineteenth century. It has
been a continuing feature of the reorganizing of bankrupt businesses.
In addition, although we do not detail them here, priority jumps can
be found in the bankruptcy rules covering pension and health benefits,
labor union contracts and their rejection in Chapter 11, and interest
payment and nonpayment.14 3
A. Recent Priority Jumps
Besides the priority jumping activity recounted in the main text, re-
cent priority jumping activity has involved gift plans, safe-harbored
payments to shareholders in leveraged buyouts, and payments to share-
holder victims of the debtor's securities fraud.
1. Gift Plans
Even the core of the venerable absolute priority rule has been subject
to sporadic successful priority jumps, through so-called "gift" plans ap-
proved by particular bankruptcy courts.14 4 A gift plan circumvents the
absolute priority rule by paying favored junior claimants or interests in-
directly through the intercession of senior creditors.145 The plan initially
143 For pension and benefits priorities, see 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945, 949-54 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd 630 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.
1980); LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 115 B.R. 760,
779-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re DIVCO Phila. Sales Corp., 64 B.R. 232, 234-35
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Cott Corp., 47 B.R. 487, 495 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); Dennis
R. Dow & Mark Moedritzer, ERISA-Related Claims in Bankruptcy, 3 J. Bankr. L. & Prac.
76, 83-94 (1993); James W. Giddens, Attempting to Protect Employee Retirement Income
Within Bankruptcy Reorganization: PBGC Efforts to Obtain Priority Status, 12 Ann. Rev.
Banking L. 397, 397-401 (1993). For union contracts, see 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006); NLRB
v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 514-15 (1984). For interest payments and nonpay-
ments, see Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 953-54 (1997); United Savings
Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 365-66 (1988); Cont'l Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re King Res. Co.), 528 F.2d 789, 791-92
(10th Cir. 1976).
14See, e.g., In re Journal Register Corp., 407 B.R. 520, 525, 529-30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009); In re Union Fin. Servs. Grp., 303 B.R. 390, 422-23 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003); In re
Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., No. 93-61004, 1994 WL 842777, at *5-6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 1994).
145 For a discussion of the history and mechanics of a "gift plan," see Bussel & Klee, supra
note 60, at 709-13; see also Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the
Third Circuit's Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Con-
struction of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 55 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1345, 1390-412 (2006).
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distributes value only to claimants senior to the dissenting class, but then
senior claimants redirect a part of their consideration to a class junior to
the dissenters, with the plan and the parties characterizing the otherwise
forbidden distribution as a "gift" from senior to junior classes.14 6 The
doctrinal rationale for permitting this scheme is that senior claimants are
free to dispose of their distributions in any way they wish.14 7 Especially
when the senior claimant holds a secured claim whose value exceeds the
combined value of the gift distribution plus the distribution retained by
the senior claimant, a court might be persuaded to view the gift as a dis-
position of the senior claimant's property, and not estate property. 148 Ei-
ther that, or plan proponents may argue that recipients are not receiving
their otherwise forbidden distributions "on account of' their junior
claims or interests, but are being paid for some other reason.149
The "gift," of course, is not charitable. The gifting creditor concludes
in its own self-interest that more value can be had from the firm if some
lower-ranking creditors are paid more. One could think of the gift as a
signing bonus-manager-stockholders are given stock to which they
would not be entitled under a narrow application of absolute priority, but
the senior creditor concludes that the creditor will overall get better re-
turns if the stockholder-managers are better motivated. Similarly, the
senior creditor could concede value on the bankrupt's debts due to its
employees and its labor union, if it concluded that a well-motivated
work force was worth the extra consideration.
The Second and Third Circuits invalidated the plans before them,5 o
explicitly recognizing the breadth of manipulation that gift plans might
146 See In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 960 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the abso-
lute priority rule is not violated when a junior claimant is "paid by the seniors out of their
higher-priority share"); In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 618 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001) (finding no violation of absolute priority when management equityholders re-
ceived a distribution over the objection of creditors because the distribution "represents an
allocation of the enterprise value otherwise distributable to the Senior Lenders, which the
Senior Lenders have agreed to offer to the top executives").
147 See Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 618.
148 See id.; see also DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am.,
Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 97 (2d. Cir. 2011); In re Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 514
(3d. Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Genesis Health).
149 See Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 515 (discussing the debtor plan proponent's
argument that the debtor's parent corporation-the debtor's old equityholder-would re-
ceive new warrants to buy common stock in the reorganized debtor, not on account of its eq-
uit interest but as consideration for the settlement of intercompany claims).
o Id. at 518; see also DBSD N. Am., 634 F.3d at 108.
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spawn."' Gift plans might routinely be used to circumvent the absolute
priority rule by simply characterizing forbidden distributions to junior
claimants as gifts from senior claimants. "Shareholders retain substantial
control over the Chapter 11 process, and with that control comes signifi-
cant opportunity for self-enrichment at the expense of creditors ... . [A]
weakened absolute priority rule could allow for serious mischief be-
tween senior creditors and existing shareholders."l5 2 These circuit deci-
sions also viewed skeptically the debtors' arguments that existing equi-
tyholders-junior to all other claimants-received gift plan distributions
on account of something other than their junior interests. The "continued
cooperation and assistance" of existing equityholders, for example, was
not a consideration independent of those equityholders' junior inter-
ests."' So the proposed distribution violated absolute priority. 154 The
senior creditor could have agreed to the gift not to motivate the manage-
rial capacities of the equityholders, but to induce them to favor and sup-
port a bankruptcy plan that benefited the senior creditors at the expense
of other creditors.
2. LBO Fraudulent Transfer Risk and the Section 546(e) Liability
Insulator
Leveraged buyout ("LBO") lenders and stockholders face fraudulent
transfer risk-the risk that, should the LBO target ultimately fail, crucial
transfers in the deal might be avoided under Section 548 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and returned to the bankrupt estate. Because the transaction
relies on the LBO target's assets to secure the financing to purchase the
target company from its shareholders, the LBO requires the transfer of
security interests in the target's assets to the LBO lenders and the trans-
fer of loan proceeds to the target's shareholders as deal consideration.
Courts have recognized actions to avoid both sorts of LBO transfers as
151 See Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 514-15 ("Allowing this particular type of
transfer would encourage parties to impermissibly sidestep the carefully crafted strictures of
the Bankruptcy Code, and would undermine Congress's intention to give unsecured creditors
barpaining power in this context."); see also DBSD N. Am., 634 F.3d at 95-101.
2 DBSD N. Am., 634 F.3d at 100.
1s3 Id. at 96 (quoting In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 419 B.R. 179, 212 n.140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009)).
154 Id. at 96-97.
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fraudulent.155 LBOs have been major, recurring transactions, so priority
mutations for LBOs count in the dealmaking, restructuring world.
Though application of fraudulent transfer laws to LBOs is not without
controversy,15 6 absent avoidance, the LBO transfers described above can
prejudice the existing claims of the target's creditors and benefit target
shareholders. Shareholders get cashed out in the LBO, while unsecured
creditors are left to collect against a debtor that is much less creditwor-
thy after the LBO than before.' The badly constructed LBO reverses
the traditional priority of creditors over equityholders by cashing out the
equityholders while leaving unsecured creditors in some degree of peril.
Application of fraudulent transfer law frustrates this attempted priori-
ty jump by equityholders if the LBO rendered the target firm insolvent.
However, after an initial spate of LBO fraudulent transfer decisions that
favored unsecured creditor interests," 8 equityholders hit upon a new ar-
gument in defense that preserves their LBO priority jumps. They argued
that their LBO payments count as "settlement payments" under Bank-
ruptcy Code Section 546(e), a provision that insulates "settlement pay-
1s See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 (3d Cir.
1986) (upholding the fraudulent transfer liability of the LBO lender); Wieboldt Stores v.
Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to dismiss the complaint as to con-
trolling shareholders, officers, directors, and the LBO lenders).
156 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its
Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 832-33 (1985); see also United States v. Gleneagles
Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 577-79 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (Gleneagles 1); United States v.
Gleneagles Inv. Co., 571 F. Supp. 935, 951-58 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (Gleneagles 11); United
States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 584 F. Supp. 671, 681-82 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (Gleneagles Ill),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 (3d Cir.
1986) (invalidating leveraged buyout as fraudulent conveyance under Pennsylvania law);
Credit Managers Ass'n v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 189 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that a
leveraged buyout was not a fraudulent conveyance); Anderson Indus., Inc. v. Anderson (In
re Anderson Indus.), 55 B.R. 922, 926 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985) (suggesting in dictum that
leveraged buyouts could constitute fraudulent conveyances).
1s7 Not only is the post-LBO debtor saddled with much more debt than before, but because
all (or almost all) of its assets are pledged to secure the LBO financing, few free assets re-
main available to pay unsecured creditors in case of distress. The subordination of unsecured
creditors to secured creditors could occur even in a garden variety financing. In the typical
financing however, the borrower firm giving security interests gets to keep the loan proceeds
to use in some productive capacity. In the LBO, by contrast, the borrower firm gives up se-
curity interests in its assets only to see the loan proceeds funneled out to its equityholders.
When the LBO improves the target firm's operating efficiencies, however, the pie is made
biger.
See especially Gleneagles III, 584 F. Supp. at 689-90.
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ments" from fraudulent transfer avoidance actions." 9 This settlement
payments exception was originally meant to address issues peculiar to
the clearing and settlement of securities trades made in public securities
markets. 160 Without the exception, a broker executing its client's sale of
publicly traded stock in an LBO could potentially have been exposed to
fraudulent transfer liability as the "initial transferee" of the fraudulent
payment when the firm paid the broker for the stock.16'
But beginning in 1991, courts expanded that safe harbor beyond
stockbrokers, applying it to LBO payments to the target shareholders
themselves. Those courts viewed the payments to cashed-out stockhold-
ers as settlements for stock trades under Section 546(e), even though
these transfers from LBO purchasers to target stockholders did not in-
volve the clearance and settlement system that Congress intended to pro-
tect.162 The decision in Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Pearl Brewing Com-
pany purports to discern the plain meaning of "settlement payment" to
include essentially any payment to shareholders in consideration for
their shares.' 63 (In fact, the statute's definition of settlement payment is
circular and self-referential, not plain.) Subsequent decisions expanded
the definition of "settlement payment" further to include payments to
shareholders in LBOs of privately held firms.164 In the jurisdictions in
'" 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). It insulates other types of payments and applies to other
forms of avoidance as well, but not to transfers made with actual fraudulent intent. Id.
160 Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 165 (1981)
(testimony of Edmund R. Schroeder, Attorney, Barrett Smith Schapiro Simon & Armstrong)
("If a firm or a clearing organization had to return margin payments received from a debtor
when he had already transmitted those funds to others in the clearing chain, its finances
could be seriously undermined to the point where it also might be driven into bankrupt-
cy.. . . [W]hen these moneys flow through the clearing chain, they are disbursed in many
different directions, and there is really no way of tracing where they have gone. Any other
firm in the chain would stand to have its own capital exposed if there were an attempt to re-
cover these moneys.").
161 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2006).
162 Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l (In re Resorts Int'l), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir. 1999);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1240
(10th Cir. 1991). But see Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98
F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply § 546(e) to LBO payments to public com-
pany shareholders); Wieboldt Stores ex rel. Raleigh v. Schottenstein, 131 B.R. 655, 665
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
163 Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d at 1239-40.
164 QSI Holdings v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings), 571 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2009); Con-
temporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2009); Brandt v. B.A. Capital
Co. LP (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 388 B.R. 46, 49 (D. Del. 2008).
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which these views prevail, shareholders' LBO priority jump over the
firm's unsecured creditors has been preserved.
The jump here did not result from congressional lobbying, but from
aggressive, creative litigation that bent existing statutory language to a
novel and unanticipated use. Given the current divergent views of courts
across the federal circuits, we can expect continuing investments in liti-
gation to extend, preserve, or oppose this LBO priority jump. Priority
was shifted in a major way and now, realistically, only Congress could
adjust it back.
3. Section 510(b) and Fair Funds Securities Fraud Distributions
Before 2002, civil penalties assessed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for securities law violations were deposited with the U.S.
Treasury. Then, with the 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
"Fair Funds Provision,"16 Congress gave the SEC discretion to distrib-
ute these funds to the victims of the related securities law violations. If
the penalized issuer is in bankruptcy, however, distribution of value to
equityholders in satisfaction of securities fraud claims directly contra-
dicts Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which subordinates equi-
tyholders' securities laws fraud claims to all other creditors' claims. 166
The rationale for Section 510(b) is that the risks of illegal issuance of
equity securities should be borne by equityholders, and not by credi-
tors. 167 To place securities fraud claims on a par with general creditor
claims would be inconsistent with the absolute priority rule, since it
would force creditors to bear equity risk, even though creditors do not
enjoy the unlimited returns that equityholders would in the case of the
165 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784-85
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006)).
166 Section 510(b) subordinates claims related to the purchase or sale of the debtor's secu-
rities to all claims that are senior or equal to the claims or interests represented by those se-
curities. If the security is common stock, the claim enjoys the same priority as common
stock.
1 7H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 195 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6156
("Placing rescinding share holders on a parity with general creditors shifts the risk of an ille-
gal stock offering to general creditors. The general creditors have not had the potential bene-
fit of the proceeds of the enterprise deriving from ownership of the securities and it is inequi-
table to permit [share holders] that have had this potential benefit to shift the loss to general
creditors.").
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firm's success. The rationale is contestable and perhaps incorrect,1 8 but
the priority structure embedded in Section 5 10(b) is clear.
Because financial distress often follows financial fraud, it is unsur-
prising that major financial scandals of the past decade involved securi-
ties fraud allegations and settlements with the SEC that led to Fair Funds
distributions. These settlements also triggered bankruptcy priority con-
cerns. In the bankruptcies of WorldCom, Inc. and Adelphia Communica-
tions Corp., the debtors settled securities fraud allegations by paying, re-
spectively, $2.25 billion and $715 million in penalties to the SEC.169 The
courts approving those settlements assumed that the government would
distribute the funds to shareholders.170 Creditors objected to the settle-
ments in both cases, arguing that any distribution to equityholders would
violate Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 7 ' But the courts in both
cases-though recognizing the tension between the Fair Funds provi-
sions and Section 51 0(b)-held the latter provision to be inapplicable,
since any anticipated distributions to equityholders would not be bank-
ruptcy plan distributions, but distributions of funds owned by the gov-
ernment. 17 2
In terms of our rent-seeking framework, the Fair Funds priority jump
is not a legislative lobbying story, but more a story involving appeal to
agency discretion-here, the SEC. The Fair Funds provision was not the
product of an organized attempt to obtain a legislative jump in bankrupt-
cy priority (although some proponents may have recognized the poten-
tial conflict with Section 510(b)). Instead, it was part of Sarbanes-
Oxley's attempt to improve investor confidence by simply providing the
168 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate Bankrupt-
cy, 1983 Duke L.J. 1, 3.
9 Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, The Honorable Jed Rakoff Approves Settlement of
SEC's Claim for a Civil Penalty Against Worldcom (July 7, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-81.htm [hereinafter SEC WorldCom Press Release];
Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, SEC and U.S. Attorney Settle Massive Financial Fraud
Case Against Adelphia and Rigas Family for $715 Million (April 25, 2005), available at
httj://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-63.htm [hereinafter SEC Adelphia Press Release].
o See SEC WorldCom Press Release, supra note 169 ("Under the terms of the settlement,
the funds paid and the common stock transferred by WorldCom to satisfy the Commission's
judgment will be distributed to victims of the company's fraud, pursuant to Section 308 (Fair
Funds For Investors) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."); SEC Adelphia Press Release,
supra note 169 ("Upon the forfeiture of these assets, Adelphia . .. will pay $715 million into
a victim fund to be established in the District Court. . . .").
171 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 75
(2d Cir. 2006); In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 327 B.R. 143, 147 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
172 WorldCom, 467 F.3d at 85; Adelphia, 327 B.R. at 169.
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possibility for some recovery to defrauded investors outside the realm of
private securities fraud litigation. The funds are not generated for the
purpose of providing compensation, and they are not peculiar to bank-
ruptcy; instead, they result from penalties and disgorgements assessed
by the SEC to deter fraud. Moreover, as Judge Rakoff noted in SEC v.
WorldCom, the SEC may not set the penalty against a debtor in bank-
ruptcy with the primary goal of compensating investors.' 3 Any distribu-
tion to defrauded equityholders is within the SEC's discretion. It is not a
bankruptcy distribution, insofar as payments do not come directly from
the estate as part of the reorganization process. Instead, it is ultimately to
the SEC that investors must turn for any recovery and for what de facto
is a priority jump.
B. Historical Priority Jumps
Priority jumping was part of reorganization practice even before there
was a formal bankruptcy statute. This Section describes important priori-
ty jumps in equity receiverships and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
the two reorganization regimes that preceded current Chapter 11.
1. Marshaling
Where a creditor holds liens on multiple items of collateral, the equi-
table doctrine of marshaling requires that the creditor look first to prop-
erty on which it holds an exclusive lien before looking to collateral en-
cumbered by junior interests.174 In effect, marshaling prevents a senior
lienor from wiping out the interests of junior lienors when the senior
lienor has the option of turning to other collateral to satisfy its claim.
The applicability of the marshaling doctrine in bankruptcy is contested,
creating opportunities for both priority jumping and defense against it.
Marshaling in bankruptcy arguably effects a priority jump. Junior
lienors' interests would otherwise be eliminated if the trustee were al-
lowed to apply shared collateral to a senior creditor's claim. Instead,
marshaling assures some recovery to junior lienors from their junior col-
lateral position, depleting assets otherwise available to unsecured credi-
m SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
174 The three prerequisites to marshaling are: (1) contesting parties must be lien creditors
of the same debtor; (2) there must be two funds belonging to the debtor; and (3) one creditor
alone must have the right to resort to both funds. See Irving D. Labovitz, Marshaling Under
the UCC: The State of the Doctrine, 99 Banking L.J. 440, 442 (1982).
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tors, whose pro rata share of the estate would increase if junior liens
were eliminated.
This priority jump has engendered both defensive efforts and attempts
to extend marshaling to other areas. Marshaling is subject to several
common law restrictions.' 75 For example, it is generally unavailable
when it would disadvantage another lienor.176 Unsecured creditors have
argued that marshaling in bankruptcy violates that restriction:17 7 Because
Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a) endows the trustee with the rights of a
lien creditor, marshaling against the bankruptcy estate constitutes mar-
shaling against lienors.'78 The Ninth Circuit has adopted this view.179
Unsecured creditors have also attempted to extend marshaling in
bankruptcy beyond its original context, arguing that equity principles al-
low unsecured creditors to marshal against a debtor's guarantors. 80
Courts including the Eighth Circuit have accepted this argument, effec-
tively permitting unsecured creditors-acting through the bankruptcy
trustee-to force secured creditors to proceed against property owned by
a debtor's guarantors before seeking recovery from the estate. Although
neither of these deviations from traditional marshaling doctrine is with-
out controversy,' 8 ' their success suggests that priority in the marshaling
context is unsettled and likely to continue drawing resources to the fray.
17s For examples, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems
Approach 561-68 (7th ed. 2012). Prejudice to unsecured creditors, however, is generally not
considered in the marshaling context. In re Robert E. Derecktor of R.I., Inc., 150 B.R. 296,
299-300 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993) ("While it is clear that marshaling ... will deplete the fund
otherwise available to unsecured creditors, we do not find such a result to constitute legal
prejudice, in the marshaling context." (emphasis omitted)).
6 Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 237 (1963) (noting that state courts decline to
marshal assets "where the rights of third parties . .. would be prejudiced"). But see LoPucki
& Warren, supra note 175, at 565 (observing that courts are split on applicability of marshal-
ing in situations where first lienor may seek payment from either of two funds, each encum-
bered by subordinate liens).
17 See, e.g., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Ctr. Wholesale (In re Ctr. Wholesale), 759
F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
17 Id.
17 Id.
1so Berman v. Green (In re Jack Green's Fashions for Men-Big and Tall), 597 F.2d 130,
133 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Multiple Servs. Indus., 18 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982).
181 See, e.g., Peoples Bank v. Computer Room, Inc. (In re The Computer Room, Inc.), 24
B.R. 732, 737 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); Whirlpool Corp. v. Plad, Inc. (In re Plad, Inc.), 24
B.R. 676, 680 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Stuhley v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re United
Med. Research), 12 B.R. 941, 944 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); Labovitz, supra note 174, at
445-46; Moses Lachman, Note, Marshaling Assets in Bankruptcy: Recent Innovations in the
Doctrine, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 671, 689 (1985).
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2. The Equity Receivership
The end of the nineteenth century saw a spate of large railroad fail-
ures. There was no bankruptcy statute to facilitate reorganization, so
federal courts grafted the equity receivership onto the litigation to create
a precursor to modem Chapter 11.182
In the railroad receivership, the receiver could issue receiver's certifi-
cates, which functioned like modem DIP loans. More importantly, the
receiver could sell the railroad. The purchaser was often a group of the
railroad's preexisting creditors, who bid in their debt to pay for the pur-
chase. Creditors excluded from the bidding group were frozen out, ena-
bling the bidding group to jump priority by cutting other creditors out of
any future stake in the reorganized railroad. The early reorganization
cases focused on the methods of putting priority back in order.
3. Chapter X Valuation
In 1938, Congress comprehensively updated bankruptcy law.'83 Chap-
ter X of the update was designed primarily by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission for the reorganization of public companies.18 4 The
statute had a New Deal feel to it, with judicial administration of the en-
terprise central to the proceeding. Pre-bankruptcy management was
ousted in favor of a court-appointed trustee, distribution was supposed to
follow strict absolute priority, and judicial valuation of the enterprise de-
termined how far down the capital structure value could be distributed.
The highest-ranking creditors were paid in full. At the claimant class
where value was insufficient for full payment, creditors received pro rata
payment. Lower-ranking creditors and stockholders were wiped out."'
Though strict absolute priority was enacted in principle, judicial valu-
ation in practice quickly altered the terrain. Courts sought to quell dis-
sent and litigation. Overvaluation accomplished this by squeezing lower-
182 Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modem Bankruptcy Theory, 89 Cornell
L. Rev. 1420, 1421-22 (2004).
18 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
184 Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganiza-
tion: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Yale L.J. 1334, 1335 (1939).
185 The valuation was "employed to foreclose the interests of junior classes of creditors
and stockholders, and no securities [would] be given any class unless all prior classes [were]
'fully compensated."' Id. at 1346. For a general discussion of Chapter X's operation, see
David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy,
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325, 1370 (1998).
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ranking creditors, and sometimes stockholders, into the distribution.
Judges seemingly felt that a "full"-that is, high-valuation of the en-
terprise was in order.'18 Market values were distrusted. After all, when
the firm recovered, it would be worth more, in ways that current valua-
tion did not capture.'18 By allowing junior claimants to share in the
bankruptcy distribution, judicial overvaluation enabled those juniors to
jump the priority of higher-ranking creditors.
1 In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. La. 1941); Note, Giving Sub-
stance to the Bonus Rule in Corporate Reorganizations: The Investment Value Doctrine
Analogy, 84 Yale. L.J. 932, 933-39 (1975).
117 Moreover, overvaluation was structurally more likely since undervaluation would elicit
bids that would drive the valuation toward the proper value. Overvaluation, by contrast,
lacked this self-corrective mechanism. See Walter J. Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensa-
tion in Corporate Reorganizations: A Reappraisal, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1958); Wal-
ter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 651, 655-61 (1974); Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of
Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 565, 566 (1950); Note, supra note 186, at 933.
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